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SUMMARY:Creditor Control Rights and the Pricing of Private Loans
DTSTART:20221102T150000
DTEND:20221102T160000
DTSTAMP:20260405T204905Z
UID:6c2eb4cfe4624cef4897ab1a7ab7743f795f3cc16f453b72e1b0f6ee
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Marc Arnold\, University of St. Gallen\nThis paper investigate
 s the influence of creditor control rights on the pricing of corporate loa
 ns. We construct a novel dataset\, which combines hand-collected covenant 
 violations data with individual borrower\, creditor\, and loan contract in
 formation. Our data allows us to distinguish between creditors that receiv
 e direct control rights after a covenant violation and creditors that do n
 ot receive control rights after a violation. By comparing the loan terms o
 f these two creditor types\, we can isolate the impact of creditor control
  rights on loan pricing from the impact of other factors related to a cove
 nant violation. We find that creditors exploit control rights to overprice
  new loans\, which is a key determinant of the loan premium puzzle.\n\n 
LOCATION:UniL Campus\, Room Extra 125
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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