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SUMMARY:Investment Subsidies with Spillovers and Endogenous Private Inform
 ation
DTSTART:20241213T114500
DTEND:20241213T130000
DTSTAMP:20260526T040644Z
UID:93be64ba626927d1daf97b2d5335c93ee5feca039f650eeb7626a661
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Alessandro Pavan - Northwestern University\nHow should firms b
 e incentivized to invest efficiently (e.g.\, in AI or the supply of smart 
 inputs) when such investments come with spillovers and their profitability
  depends on uncertain aggregate economic conditions? We show that firms ca
 n be encouraged to collect information and then use it in society’s best
  interest through a subsidy that resembles a Pigouvian correction but acco
 unts for the non-verifiability of firms’ acquisition and usage of inform
 ation. The same fiscal policy sustains efficiency in information acquisiti
 on and usage when prices are sticky\, under an appropriate monetary policy
  that induces firms to disregard their endogenous private information when
  setting prices and only use it for investment purposes.\n 
LOCATION:UniL Campus\, Room Extra 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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