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SUMMARY:Voting choice
DTSTART:20250307T114500
DTEND:20250307T130000
DTSTAMP:20260404T084206Z
UID:2dd1e20ccca56642a4e364e35b1000158846ebd633abcf8824a14e8c
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Nadya Malenko - Boston College\nTraditionally\, fund managers 
 cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently\, there is a shift toward
 s "pass-through voting\," with fund managers offering their investors a ch
 oice: delegate their votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a th
 eory of delegation of voting rights to study the implications of such voti
 ng choice. If investors have heterogeneous preferences\, voting choice may
  decrease investor welfare because investors retain voting rights excessiv
 ely\, prioritizing their preferences over information. If investors have h
 eterogeneous information\, voting choice generally improves investor welfa
 re. However\, it may decrease fund managers' information collection effort
 \, resulting in less informed voting outcomes.
LOCATION:UniL Campus\, Room Extra 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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