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SUMMARY:Dynamic contracting with many agents
DTSTART:20260320T110000
DTEND:20260320T121500
DTSTAMP:20260430T125743Z
UID:00c674b1583264777e1708066015bdcff07fa6f4bffc0bb65bf5bbbf
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Elu von Thadden - University of Mannheim\nWe extend Merton (1
 969)’s analysis of capital allocation and consumption-savings choices to
  the case in which asset management is delegated to several privately info
 rmed agents. With a continuum of agents\, mean-field control techniques yi
 eld a simple and intuitive solution: capital reallocation is linear in rel
 ative performance\, and managers’ fees are proportional to assets under-
 management. We show that these properties do not obtain in the single agen
 t case. We also show that continuation utilities are exposed to idiosyncra
 tic risk and increasingly unequal between managers. Finally\, investment i
 s lower than under symmetric information because incentive constraints red
 uce risk sharing.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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