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SUMMARY:Information-Concealing Credit Architecture
DTSTART:20260323T121500
DTEND:20260323T131500
DTSTAMP:20260405T201314Z
UID:3700ab277d97704e5f64ce3abe20b154faa2325e6db8b8ebcd25fe3d
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Ye Li - University of Washington\nWhen the value of a pledgeab
 le asset (or project) is uncertain\, investors are tempted to examine it. 
 The information cost is ultimately borne by the asset owner\, reducing her
  financing capacity. A pecking order emerges. Debt generates a greater fin
 ancing capacity than equity: unlike equity investors who own the asset dir
 ectly\, creditors own the asset only if the borrower defaults and\, theref
 ore\, have weaker incentives to acquire information. The probabilistic ass
 et ownership can be further diluted by introducing intermediaries between 
 the borrower and the creditor\, leading to a new theory of financial inter
 mediation and credit chains. We demonstrate that the optimal financial arc
 hitecture involves systematically sequencing multiple intermediaries\nwith
  heterogeneous information costs and asset correlations\, rationalizing th
 e seemingly excessive complexity of intermediated credit flows.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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