BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Dealer Intermediation in OTC Markets with Private Valuation
DTSTART:20260519T121500
DTEND:20260519T131500
DTSTAMP:20260602T225738Z
UID:aa916b07deeb1ab10e7cc24e4efe6fc0e1f6f4dc1ccff48db56fb383
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Darius Nik Nejad - SFI@EPFL PhD student  \nWe develop a gener
 al equilibrium theory of dealer intermediation in over-the-counter (OTC) m
 arkets with private investor valuations. Trading occurs through a competit
 ive request-for-quote (RFQ) protocol in which dealers submit price quotes 
 without observing investor types. The model nests the standard voice tradi
 ng channel. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibr
 ium and characterize it through a system of functional equations. We decom
 pose the effects of adverse selection into a scale effect\, reflecting the
  total mass of investors on each side of the marginal type\, and a composi
 tion effect\, reflecting the shape of the distribution. This decomposition
  characterizes how equilibrium outcomes respond to changes in supply. Gene
 ral equilibrium feedback effects overturn standard intuitions about how de
 aler competition affects prices: greater competition does not uniformly im
 prove trading terms and induces some investors to trade less. The economy 
 with private valuations is equivalent to an economy without private inform
 ation but with type-dependent trading frictions and effective bargaining p
 ower. In equilibrium\, quote distributions generate bid–ask spreads\, pr
 ice dispersion\, and strictly positive probabilities of trade failure. Our
  theory characterizes these objects in terms of the primitives of the econ
 omy.\n(with Julien Hugonnier)
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR