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SUMMARY:Polarizing Green Disclosure
DTSTART:20261113T110000
DTEND:20261113T121500
DTSTAMP:20261109T140516Z
UID:56c231d5d1d0271f785d4499cec5264a7ae43cbb299fdaaaeb566c78
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Alexandr Kopytov - University of Rochester\nWe study how green
  disclosure shapes portfolios and green investment. Disclosure polarizes s
 hareholders and greenness outcomes: green investors concentrate in green f
 irms and push them to become greener\, while brown firms are held by less-
 green investors and reduce greenness. Because brown firms typically have c
 heaper opportunities to increase greenness\, this sorting reduces aggregat
 e greenness and imposes an externality cost despite improving allocative e
 fficiency. Disclosure alone is not always welfare-improving and is complem
 entary to externality-correcting policies such as carbon pricing. Welfare-
 maximizing managers overdisclose because they internalize disclosure's all
 ocative gain but not its externality cost\; price-maximizing managers can 
 deliver higher welfare.\n 
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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