BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept  
DTSTART:20110622T131500
DTSTAMP:20260508T120328Z
UID:1ac5085b7940c9120583bda095c45bd1188cd6e09aca189c978c8340
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Joseph Y. Halpern\, Cornell University\nFor some well-kn
 own games\, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game\, traditi
 onal game-theoretic solution concepts -- most notably Nash equilibrium -- 
 predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations.  We 
 introduce a new solution concept\, iterated regret minimization\, which ex
 hibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in ma
 ny games of interest\, including Traveler's Dilemma\, the Centipede Game\,
  Nash bargaining\, and Bertrand competition.  As the name suggests\, itera
 ted regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that 
 do not minimize regret. We provide an epistemic characterization of iterat
 ed regret minimization\, show how it works in many settings. Prof Halpern'
 s homepage
LOCATION:BC 01 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room==BC%2001
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR