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SUMMARY:Vanishing Signals: Trading Agent Kills Market Information (Evidenc
 e from a Natural Experiment in Online Social Lending)
DTSTART:20110623T091500
DTSTAMP:20260428T021505Z
UID:bb616633040459261206a8af0ecb65edf4adefdfbda9e7bb87369f28
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Jens Grossklags\, Pennsylvania State University\nAdvance
 s in information technology enable the creation of new markets as social c
 oordination mechanisms in numerous ways\, including those where humans and
  computer algorithms interact. Because humans and computers differ in thei
 r capabilities to emit and process market signals\, there is a need to und
 erstand what determines the aggregate level of signaling. We frame the ari
 sing signaling regime as alternative equilibrium outcomes in a coordinatio
 n game. More specifically\, we tackle the general research question from t
 he perspective of new electronic credit markets. On online social lending 
 platforms\, borrowers' offers typically contain detailed personal informat
 ion next to hard facts such as credit ratings. We investigate whether a ch
 ange of the market mechanisms in the form of the introduction of an automa
 ted trading agent shifts the dynamics of information revelation from a hig
 h-effort signaling norm to a low-effort information equilibrium. After dev
 eloping the theoretical background for our analysis\, we scrutinize our hy
 pothesis in the form of a natural experiment at Smava.de and find strong s
 upport for our proposition. Prof. Grossklags' homepage
LOCATION:BC 01 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room==BC%2001
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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