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SUMMARY:Taxes\, debts\, and redistributions with aggregate shocks
DTSTART:20140606T103000
DTEND:20140606T120000
DTSTAMP:20260406T170442Z
UID:952d9024a76f61c4db0e34fbcd068cba787eaf1299f31e5fa5c29a63
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Mikhail GOLOSOV (Princeton University)\nA planner sets a lump 
 sum transfer and a linear tax on labor income in an economy with incomplet
 e markets\, heterogeneous agents\, and aggregate shocks. The planner's con
 cerns about redistribution impart a welfare cost to fluctuating transfers.
  The distribution of net asset holdings across agents affects optimal allo
 cations\, transfers\, and tax rates\, but the level of government debt doe
 s not. Two forces shape longrun outcomes: the planner's desire to minimize
  the welfare costs of fluctuating transfers\, which calls for a negative c
 orrelation between the distribution of net assets and agents' skills\; and
  the planner's desire to use fluctuations in the real interest rate to adj
 ust for missing state contingent securities. In a model parameterized to m
 atch stylized facts about US booms and recessions\, distributional concern
 s mainly determine optimal policies over business cycle frequencies. These
  features of optimal policy differ markedly from ones that emerge from rep
 resentative agent Ramsey models like Aiyagari et al. (2002).
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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