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SUMMARY:Brownbag Seminar by Prof. Rick Vanden Bergh (University of Vermont
 )
DTSTART:20140604T120000
DTEND:20140604T130000
DTSTAMP:20260501T085025Z
UID:e631449115a456a7abe2ed68fe148eb4cc3a18027d0d995d40d49e4c
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Rick Vanden Bergh (University of Vermont)\nSeminar organ
 ized by UNIL-HEC\n"POLITICAL STRATEGY IN CONTESTED STAKEHOLDER ENVIRONMENT
 S: EVIDENCE FROM THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR"\nHost(s): Jean-Philippe Bona
 rdi\nWe examine how and why electric utilities use political strategies to
  protect economic rents created by mergers and acquisitions against dissip
 ation by regulators and stakeholders. In regulated industries\, stakeholde
 rs (e.g.\, special interest groups) can influence regulators who\, in turn
 \, can impose costly merger conditions\, for instance consumer rate reduct
 ions in the utilities sector\, thereby reducing shareholder gains. We inve
 stigate empirically whether and how utilities use election campaign contri
 butions to politicians as a method to counteract stakeholders and influenc
 e regulatory merger approvals.  We develop a unique dataset to test our h
 ypotheses.  Using utility-specific data we develop a time-varying measure
  of the degree to which stakeholders influence regulatory policy affecting
  the utility.  Additionally we have identified the timing and economic re
 nt characteristics of every merger and acquisition proposals that require 
 regulatory approval for every state-level operating utility in the United 
 States.  We combine this data with utility-level campaign contribution da
 ta to create a panel for the time period 1999 to 2010.  We conduct a stat
 istical analysis of campaign contributions and find that utilities increas
 ed their contributions in the year before announcement of a merger\, and t
 hat utilities increased their contributions more when facing highly contes
 ted stakeholder environments\, and when merger rents are expected to be la
 rge.  Our findings contribute to political strategy research by providing
  novel evidence that campaign contributions are a form of investment in th
 e political process to mitigate the risk of rent dissipation by both regul
 ators and stakeholders.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 110 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-110
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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