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SUMMARY:Competing with Asking Prices
DTSTART:20150306T103000
DTEND:20150306T120000
DTSTAMP:20260501T182321Z
UID:205a23a708d13cae81dcd754cc47ca2b35102f1f4cc961961b36b4d7
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Benjamin LESTER (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)\nIn man
 y markets\, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a p
 rice at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immed
 iately\, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below th
 e asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives 
 no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world mark
 ets\, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literat
 ure. We construct an environment with a few simple\, realistic ingredients
  and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing 
 mechanism that maximizes sellers’ revenues and it implements the efficie
 nt outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this 
 equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricin
 g mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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