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SUMMARY:Debt Renegotiation and Investment Decisions Across Countries
DTSTART:20150116T103000
DTEND:20150116T120000
DTSTAMP:20260916T063923Z
UID:668200e3d9dda3a865083dd10d86714699b8fc58482d77343079d793
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Enrique SCHROTH (Cass Business School)\nWe show that the prosp
 ect of a successful debt renegotiation in default reduces debt overhang an
 d induces shareholders of distressed firms to underinvest less\, dismiss l
 ess assets\, and take on less risk. We identify these effects in the data 
 via the exogeneous variation in debt renegotiation procedures prescribed b
 y bankruptcy codes across 41 countries. Consistent with our theory\, we fi
 nd that the effects of debt renegotiation frictions operate through their 
 interactions with the expected creditors' recovery conditional on default.
  These effects are large\, statistically signi ficant\, and point to benef
 icial ex-post implications of weaker debt enforcement procedures.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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