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SUMMARY:Entry and Exit in OTC Derivatives Markets
DTSTART:20150615T140000
DTEND:20150615T153000
DTSTAMP:20261005T011636Z
UID:45d5e1bd949c7051ddbaec91e0c59052877a99845553db33a4e66cee
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Pierre-Olivier WEILL (UCLA)\nWe develop a parsimonious model t
 o study the equilibrium and socially optimal decisions of banks to enter\,
  trade in\, and possibly exit\, an OTC market. Although we endow all banks
  with the same trading technology\, banks’ optimal entry and trading dec
 isions endogenously lead to a realistic market structure comprised of deal
 ers and customers with distinct trading patterns. We decompose banks’ en
 try incentives into incentives to hedge risk and incentives to make interm
 ediation profits. We show that dealer banks enter more than is socially op
 timal. In the face of large negative shocks\, they may also exit more than
  is socially optimal when markets are not perfectly resilient.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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