BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?
DTSTART:20150320T103000
DTEND:20150320T120000
DTSTAMP:20260528T015136Z
UID:e60a9c3d2033ae34d6355d51be2fc0897a7e1a16c292a92e36ae6e2d
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:B. Espen ECKBO (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth)\nThe est
 imated probability that a bidder offers all-stock as payment in takeovers 
 increases with measures of market overvaluation of bidder shares. However\
 , when we instrument the bidder pricing error using aggregate mutual fund 
 flows\, the reverse happens: greater bidder overvaluation reduces the all-
 stock payment  propensity. Since the price pressure created by aggregate 
 fund flows is exogenous to bidder fundamentals - while directly impacting 
 bidder pricing errors - this  evidence rejects the notion that all-stock 
 financed takeovers are opportunistic. Bidders paying with stock tend to be
  small\, non- dividend paying growth companies with low leverage\, suggest
 ing that financing constraints play an important role in the all-stock pay
 ment decision. Moreover\, all-stock payment is more likely in  high-tech 
 industries\, when the two firms operate in highly complementary industries
 \, and when the target is geographically close\, indicating that targets i
 n all-stock bids are relatively informed about bidder value. Overall\, our
  evidence does not suggest a particular role for bidder mispricing in driv
 ing the all-stock payment decision in takeovers.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CANCELLED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR