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SUMMARY:Designing a Combinatorial Market for Offloading Cellular Traffic v
 ia Wireless Access Points
DTSTART:20150604T151500
DTEND:20150604T161500
DTSTAMP:20260407T031656Z
UID:c054c71a8b66cc97812e7af3bc4c660c6212bdfdbc5fb89783793c10
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Sven Seuken\, University of Zurich (Switzerland)\nEvery year\,
  mobile network operators (MNOs) around the world\nspend billions of dolla
 rs expanding their mobile networks\, to cope with\nthe exponentially incre
 asing demand for 3G and 4G bandwidth. Cellular\ncapacity is particularly s
 carce in inner-city locations during the\nmiddle of the day. At the same t
 ime\, the majority of wireless access\npoints (residential and commercial)
  are largely idle most of the time\,\ni.e.\, the cheap Internet bandwidth 
 provided by Internet Service\nProviders (ISPs) remains largely unused. Thi
 s gives rise to\nopportunities for trade\, where some of the peak-time cel
 lular traffic\nfrom the MNOs is offloaded via wireless access points\, in 
 exchange for\npayments from the MNOs to the ISPs. However\, determining op
 timal\nallocations and prices is challenging from a computational and econ
 omic\nperspective\, in particular because MNOs have complex\, combinatoria
 l\npreferences: their need and their value for offloading traffic vary by\
 nlocation and by time-of-day.\nIn this paper\, we propose a market design 
 solution for this problem\,\nwhere an intermediary sets up a smart market 
 platform that automatically\nestablishes trades between sellers and buyers
 . We first describe how the\npreferences of the sellers and buyers in this
  domain can be modeled\nsuccinctly. Then we introduce a combinatorial allo
 cation mechanism that\ncomputes an optimal allocation\, i.e.\, which MNOs 
 get to offload how much\nof their traffic in which of their cell sectors a
 nd at what time of the\nday. Finally\, we show how to use core-selecting c
 ombinatorial auctions\nin this domain to computes prices for each MNO\, wh
 ile minimizing the\nincentives for the MNOs to misreport their values. We 
 conclude by\ndiscussing a number of challenges that arise in fielding this
  mechanism\nin practice.
LOCATION:BC 420 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room==BC%20420
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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