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SUMMARY:Delegated Information Acquisition and Asset Pricing
DTSTART:20150605T103000
DTEND:20150605T120000
DTSTAMP:20260925T075241Z
UID:a308b57131d5cc98f5db091803d34f288f5d3a0bd8db718fe4be5f5c
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Shiyang HUANG (LSE)\nThis paper studies the joint determinatio
 n of optimal contracts and equilibrium asset prices in an economy with mul
 tiple principal-agent pairs. Principals design optimal contracts that prov
 ide incentives for agents to acquire costly information. With agency probl
 ems\, the agents' compensation depends on the accuracy of their forecasts 
 for asset prices and payoff\ns. Complementarities in information acquisiti
 on delegation arise as follows. As more principals hire agents to acquire 
 information\, asset prices become less noisy. Consequently\, agents are mo
 re willing to acquire information because they can forecast asset prices m
 ore accurately\, thus mitigating agency problems and encouraging other pri
 ncipals to hire agents. This mechanism can explain many interesting phenom
 ena in markets\, including multiple equilibria\, herding\, home bias and i
 diosyncratic volatility comovement.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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