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SUMMARY:Will Intermediate for Data: Information Sharing in U.S. Treasury A
 uctions
DTSTART:20151002T103000
DTEND:20151002T120000
DTSTAMP:20260501T134039Z
UID:b276d2d5a6dd278643f4e7265a9075e3ff18ec9cdf621ebaf2ab18a5
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Nina BOYARCHENKO (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)\nAccording
  to most financial intermediation theories\, the prevalence of primary dea
 lers is puzzling. They do not transform liquidity or maturity\; they do no
 t screen and monitor borrowers or diversify fiscal policy risk. Yet\, most
  end investors place their Treasury auction bids through an intermediary r
 ather than submit them directly.  Motivated by this evidence\, we explore
  a new model of intermediaries as advisors. Intermediaries observe each cl
 ient's order flow\, aggregate that information across clients\, and use it
  to advise their clients as a group. Although informationsharing is often 
 maligned\, it typically increases treasury revenue\, but also makes revenu
 e more variable. When bidders can choose whether or not to bid through a d
 ealer\, a new financial accelerator emerges. We use the model to examine c
 urrent policy questions\, such as the optimal number of intermediaries\, t
 he effect of nonintermediated bids\, and minimum bidding requirements. 
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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