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SUMMARY:Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values
DTSTART:20151113T103000
DTEND:20151113T120000
DTSTAMP:20260429T012222Z
UID:216ef1358803a50d3a73df6e6c41ec7fdce6f92b1e301d38652b2383
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:William FUCHS (Berkeley Haas)\nWe study information spillovers
  in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset
  values. A trade of one asset (or lack thereof) can provide information ab
 out the value of other assets. The information content of this trading beh
 avior is endogenously determined in equilibrium. We show that this endogen
 eity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset value
 s is sufficiently high. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade v
 olume and efficiency. We study the implications for policies that target m
 arket transparency as well as the market's ability to aggregate informatio
 n. Total welfare is higher in any equilibrium of a fully transparent marke
 t than in a fully opaque one. However\, both welfare and trading activity 
 can decrease in the degree of market transparency. If traders have asymmet
 ric access to transaction data\, transparency levels the playing field\, r
 educes the rents of more informed traders\, but may also reduce total welf
 are. Moreover\, even in a fully transparent market\, information is not ne
 cessarily aggregated as the number of informed traders becomes arbitrarily
  large.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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