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SUMMARY:Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
DTSTART:20160219T103000
DTEND:20160219T120000
DTSTAMP:20261001T005807Z
UID:6914a0cc560643209ed577b1365166e2e0ef7064b31e29b8db3acf6c
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Martin OEHMKE (Columbia Business School)\nWe study the efficie
 nt resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of- ent
 ry (SPOE) resolution\, where loss-absorbing capacity is shared across juri
 sdictions\, is efficient\, but may not be implementable. First\, when expe
 cted transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric\, national regulato
 rs fail to set up an efficient SPOE resolution regime ex ante. Second\, wh
 en the required ex-post transfers across jurisdictions are too large\, nat
 ional regulators ring-fence local banking assets\, instead of cooperating 
 in a planned SPOE resolution. In this case\, constrained efficient resolut
 ion is achieved through multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution\, where 
 some loss-absorbing capacity is pre-assigned to national holding companies
  in each jurisdiction. Our analysis highlights a complementarity between b
 ank resolution and the organizational structure of global banks—the more
  decentralized a global bank’s operations\, the greater the relative eff
 iciency of MPOE resolution.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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