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SUMMARY:Bank Liability Structure
DTSTART:20151204T103000
DTEND:20151204T120000
DTSTAMP:20260407T101154Z
UID:04ba29dd7cd2c28406e440effbe1679cfb66f2326c5a9216bf7fe707
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Suresh SUNDARESAN (Columbia Business School)\nWe develop\, and
  solve analytically\, a dynamic model of optimal bank liability structure 
 that incorporates bank run\, regulatory closure\, endogenous default\, and
  endogenous deposit-insurance premium. Value maximizing banks choose the r
 atio of deposits to subordinated debt so that endogenous default coincides
  with bank closure. Banks’ optimal response to regulatory changes often 
 counteracts regulators’ objective in reducing bank failures. For example
 \, the optimal response to the introduction of FDIC is to increase leverag
 e by choosing a higher deposit ratio and a lower subordinated-debt ratio. 
 We also find that banks’ optimal leverage can be substantial even in the
  absence of material tax benefits.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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