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PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
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SUMMARY:Voluntary Disclosures and Informed Trading
DTSTART:20151110T120000
DTEND:20151110T130000
DTSTAMP:20260407T105731Z
UID:58e939df935b898e9f59d5e6cc54c70e6b55a4753ad90ce0cb8ab2e1
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Evgeny PETROV (PhD Student\, SFI@EPFL)\nI develop a model of v
 oluntary corporate disclosures to asymmetrically informed risk-averse trad
 ers who can acquire costly private information. The firm manager who maxim
 izes the firm's asset price faces a tradeoff. On the one hand\, optimal di
 sclosure should alleviate information asymmetry to increase the price. On 
 the other hand\, reducing information asymmetry decreases the profits of i
 nformed traders\, crowds out private information acquisition and drives th
 e price down. The crowding-out  effect gives novel predictions. For examp
 le\, higher risk-aversion of traders or higher cost of private information
  acquisition can make manager disclose less information.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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