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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:IC Colloquium : How Computer Science Informs Modern Auction Design
DTSTART:20151123T161500
DTEND:20151123T173000
DTSTAMP:20260406T170601Z
UID:18c3a93de86eccd38e67f9b887583ea6c3d3c0f017ca5d58de35b54e
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:By : Tim Roughgarden - Stanford UniversityVideo of his talkAbs
 tract :\nEconomists have studied the theory and practice of auctions for d
 ecades. How can computer science contribute? Using the upcoming (March 29\
 , 2016) U.S. FCC double-auction for wireless spectrum as a case study\, I'
 ll illustrate the many answers: novel auction formats\, algorithms for NP-
 hard problems\, approximation guarantees for simple auctions\, and communi
 cation complexity-based impossibility results.Bio :\nTim Roughgarden is an
  Associate Professor of Computer Science and (by courtesy) Management Scie
 nce and Engineering at Stanford University. He received a BS in Applied Ma
 thematics from Stanford in 1997\, and a PhD in Computer Science from Corne
 ll in 2002.\nHis research interests include the many connections between c
 omputer science and economics\, as well as the design\, analysis\, and app
 lications of algorithms. For his research\, he has been awarded the ACM Gr
 ace Murray Hopper Award\, the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientis
 ts and Engineers (PECASE)\, the Shapley Lecturership of the Game Theory So
 ciety\, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize\, INFORM’s Optimization Priz
 e for Young Researchers\,  the Mathematical Programming Society’s Tucke
 r Prize\, and the EATCS-SIGACT Gödel Prize.More information
LOCATION:BC 420 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room==BC%20420
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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