BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Seminar by Prof. Yaroslav Rosokha\, Purdue University
DTSTART:20160318T120000
DTEND:20160318T133000
DTSTAMP:20260427T201940Z
UID:1f2a2412f1212f273c2d039399b62d2de01e80f20f0dc532428e047e
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Yaroslav Rosokha\, Purdue University\n"Constructing Stra
 tegies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”Abstract:\
 nWe propose a new approach for running lab experiments on indefinitely rep
 eated games with high continuation probability.  The approach has two mai
 n advantages.  First\, it allows us to run multiple long repeated games p
 er session.  Second\, it allows us to incorporate the strategy method wit
 h minimal restrictions on the types of strategies that can be constructed.
   This gives us insight into what happens in long repeated games and into
  the types of strategies that subjects use. We report results obtained fro
 m the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with a continuation probabi
 lity of $ \\delta = .99 $. We find rates of cooperation that are lower tha
 n expected\, given that the indefinitely repeated games are long and the s
 etting is approaching the continuous time form. However\, when we analyze 
 the constructed strategies our results are largely similar to those found 
 in the literature\, specifically that the most common strategies are memor
 y-1 strategies such as Tit-For-Tat\, Grim Trigger\, and Always Defect.
LOCATION:EPFL\, ODY 4.03\, VIP Room http://plan.epfl.ch/?zoom=19&recenter_
 y=5863800.12869&recenter_x=731560.22521&layerNodes=fonds\,batiments\,label
 s\,information\,parkings_publics\,arrets_metro\,transports_publics&floor=4
 &q=ODY_4.03
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR