BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Persuading the Regulator to Wait
DTSTART:20161007T103000
DTEND:20161007T120000
DTSTAMP:20260407T042008Z
UID:e1028f0429d14f4675bdd6e5aa3f6fed51b87892d709d479506f3fb3
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Pavel ZRYUMOV (Wharton)\nWe study a Bayesian persuasion game i
 n the context of real options. The Sender (firm) chooses signals to reveal
  to the Receiver (regulator) each period but  has no long-term commitment
  power. The Receiver chooses when to exercise the option\, affecting welfa
 re of both parties. When the Sender favors late exercise  relative to the
  Receiver but their disagreement is small\, in the unique equilibrium info
 rmation is disclosed discretely with a delay and the Receiver sometimes  
 ex-post regrets waiting too long. When disagreement is large\, the Sender\
 , instead of acquiring information once and fully\, pipets good informatio
 n over time.  These results shed light on the post-market surveillance pr
 actices of medical drugs and instruments by the FDA\, and the role of phar
 maceutical companies in  keeping marginally beneficial drugs in the marke
 t. When the Sender favors early exercise\, the lack of commitment not to p
 ersuade in the future leads to  unraveling\, in equilibrium all informati
 on is disclosed immediately. In sharp contrast to static environments\, th
 e ability to persuade might hurt the Sender. 
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR