BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Only time will tell - A Theory of deferred compensantion
DTSTART:20160916T103000
DTEND:20160916T120000
DTSTAMP:20260506T205411Z
UID:c683476a7a9865b0631546c9af441d38d068503d7879736526d0d1eb
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Marcus OPP (UC Berkeley\, Haas School of Business)\nWe charact
 erize optimal contract design in settings where the principal observes inf
 ormative signals about the agent's initial action over time. Under bilater
 al risk-neutrality and limited liability of the agent\, all relevant featu
 res of a signal process can be encoded in a single “informativeness” f
 unction. This function is increasing in time and fully captures the notion
  of ``only time will tell.'' We then show how the principal uses the timin
 g dimension of the compensation contract to extract rents from the agent v
 ia the use of more informative performance signals. Optimal contracts trad
 e off the rent-extraction benefit of deferral with the associated costs re
 sulting from the agent's relative impatience. Our framework lends itself t
 o evaluate the effects of recent regulatory proposals in the financial sec
 tor mandating the deferral of bonus payments and the use of claw-back clau
 ses.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR