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SUMMARY:Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Vote
 rs
DTSTART:20180427T103000
DTEND:20180427T120000
DTSTAMP:20260916T202709Z
UID:fed3c39c4c1996564b132b43e46d3dde20a16135adff18322db5b889
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Nadya MALENKO (Boston College)\nWe analyze how proxy advisors\
 , which sell voting recommendations to shareholders\, affect corporate dec
 ision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low\, there i
 s overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information
  production. In contrast\, if the advisor's information is precise\, it ma
 y be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize
  profits. Overall\, the advisor's presence leads to more informative votin
 g only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several pro
 posals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies\
 , such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation p
 ressure\, can have negative effects.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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