I illustra te that the equilibria of games with strategic complementarities may be of little predictive value if the players have non-compact action sets. Moti vated by this observation\, I study a class of macroeconomic models in whi ch all firms can costlessly choose any price at each date from a compact i nterval (indexed to last period’s price level). I prove three results th at are valid for any such compact interval. First\, given any allocation\, there is a (possibly time-dependent) specification of monetary and fiscal policy that implies that allocation is part of an equilibrium. Second\, g iven any specification of monetary and fiscal policy in which the former i s time invariant and the latter is Ricardian (in the sense of Woodford (19 95))\, there is a sequence of equilibria in which consumption converges to zero on a date-by-date basis. These first two results suggest that standa rd macroeconomic models without pricing bounds (be they sticky or flex pri ce) provide a false degree of confidence in long-run macroeconomic stabili ty and undue faith in the long-run irrelevance of monetary policy. The pap er’s final result constructs a non-Ricardian nominal framework (in which the long-run growth rate of nominal government liabilities is sufficientl y high) that pins down a unique stable real outcome as an equilibrium.

LOCATION:Unil\, Extranef building\, room 126 STATUS:CONFIRMED END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR