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SUMMARY:Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks
DTSTART:20190201T103000
DTEND:20190201T120000
DTSTAMP:20260930T211215Z
UID:8cfb6e11f6db6f13ce4082cc2fc7d2941bb7b820cb1cdf7cc68f73ff
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Denis GROMB\, HEC Paris\nHow do resolution frameworks affect t
 he private restructuring of distressed banks? We model a distressed bank's
  shareholders and creditors negotiating a  restructuring given asymmetric
  information about asset quality and externalities onto the government. Th
 is yields negotiation delays used to signal asset  quality. we find that 
 strict bail-in rules increase delays by worsening informational frictions 
 and reducing bargaining surplus. We characterize optimal bail-in rules for
  the government. We then consider the government's possible involvement in
  negotiations. We find this can lead to shorter or longer delays. Notably\
 , the  government may gin from committing not to partake in negotiations.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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