BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:CES Seminar: Screening with rational inattention
DTSTART:20180928T121500
DTEND:20180928T130000
DTSTAMP:20260414T175432Z
UID:c744afeeee5a6756ac9580b17e5e8c5d44bd1ba2f2dcee1c325d08e3
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Mogens Fosgerau Mogens is a professor of economics at th
 e University of Copenhagen. He holds an ERC Advanced grant on Generalized 
 Entropy Models and is chief editor (joint with Erik Verhoef) of Economics 
 of Transportation. He has published in transportation\, economics\, econom
 etrics\, mathematics\, and physics.\nA rationally inattentive screening ag
 ency accepts or rejects candidates\, aiming to select those candidates tha
 t meet a given requirement. Candidates choose effort to increase their pro
 bability of being qualified and hence their probability of being accepted 
 by the screener. This generic structure appears in many different contexts
 . We find that equilibrium behaviors are remarkably easy to characterize 
 in terms of model primitives. There are typically two equilibria\, one wit
 h high efforts on both sides and one with low efforts. Self-fulfilling pro
 phecies and segregation may occur in equilibrium\, even between ex ante id
 entical candidate pools\, and affirmative action may lead to surprising co
 nsequences.\n 
LOCATION:GC B1 10 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room=GCB110
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR