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VERSION:2.0
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SUMMARY:Designing Decentralized Systems with Incentives
DTSTART:20181210T161500
DTSTAMP:20260407T011318Z
UID:5797fdab3f01c6d280a638f01d6e8c14998dae5dd4b8c22fbb769c5e
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:By Sarah Azouvi\, UCL Computer Science Department\, University
  College London\nAbstract\nBy considering mechanism design and economic ar
 guments to incentivise honest participation and provide security\, blockch
 ains allow for a completely open setting. This setting requires new consen
 sus protocols\, and thus new assumptions and security properties. In this 
 talk\, I will discuss the idea of decentralization and how it relates to G
 ame Theory\, Distributed Systems and Cryptography. I will present Fantomet
 te\, a new consensus protocol for blockchains that relies on Proof-of-Stak
 e rather than the more energy-consuming Proof-of-Work used in Bitcoin and 
 provides strong game-theoretic guarantees. I will also discuss other aspec
 ts of decentralization\, in particular relating to the central governance 
 structure that exists in decentralized systems. \n \nBiography\nI am a P
 hD Student at the UCL Computer Science Department in the Information Secur
 ity Group. My supervisors are Dr Sarah Meiklejohn and Prof George Danezis.
  My research interests are Applied Cryptography\, Distributed Systems and 
 Game Theory. In particular\, I am interested in blockchain consensus proto
 cols and how incentives can be incorporated and formally reasoned about wi
 thin them to allow for more secure and performant systems. Furthermore\, I
  am interested in the governance of decentralized systems and what it mean
 s to be decentralized when an inherent central governance structure exists
 .\n 
LOCATION:BC 420 https://plan.epfl.ch/?room==BC%20420
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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