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SUMMARY:Bail-ins and Bail-outs: Incentives\, Connectivity\, and Systemic S
 tability
DTSTART:20200320T103000
DTEND:20200320T120000
DTSTAMP:20260601T064124Z
UID:e249540dfea03edda31c943e1cacd00a34010e1756df5986c21ae13e
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Agostino CAPPONI\, Columbia University\nWe develop a framework
  for analyzing how banks can be incentivized to make contributions to a vo
 luntary bail-in and ascertaining the kinds of inter-bank linkages that are
  most conducive to a bail-in. Incentives for banks to contribute to a bail
 -in arise from their exposure to credit and price-mediated contagion.  In
  equilibrium\, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator’s threat to n
 ot bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without interv
 ention or with government bailouts only\, sparse networks are beneficial f
 or two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator’s no-
 bailout threat for large shocks and they reduce free-riding incentives amo
 ng bail-in contributors when the threat is credible. (joint work with Benj
 amin Bernard and Joseph Stiglitz)\n 
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CANCELLED
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