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SUMMARY:The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control
DTSTART:20200228T103000
DTEND:20200228T120000
DTSTAMP:20260526T040317Z
UID:924e4dd7c3031d90d5223b94681bc6705aba5d65745cf7e6b0fc4fa5
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Mike BURKART\, LSE\nThe free-rider problem in takeovers is in 
 essence a (coordination) failure to "negotiate" mutually beneficial terms.
  Means for bidders to unilaterally seize gains could solve this issue but 
 target shareholders prefer to limit such means. We show that takeover debt
  can bridge this divide in that debt constraints can serve as Pareto-impro
 ving ``sharing rules." In this theory (i) leveraged buyouts are privately 
 and socially optimal and (ii) competing bidders raise more debt\, amplifyi
 ng gains to target shareholders and in takeover efficiency. At its best\, 
 leveraging bids neutralizes the free-rider problem---to mutual benefit.
LOCATION:UNIL\, Extranef\, room 126 https://planete.unil.ch/plan/?local=EX
 T-126
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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