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SUMMARY:CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field
DTSTART:20210521T103000
DTEND:20210521T120000
DTSTAMP:20260510T055739Z
UID:3494e7dee235ff4c7e083b51b2e960af2424049ba402409c38df12b0
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Alex EDMANS\, London Business School\, CEPR\, and ECGI\nWe sur
 vey directors and investors on the objectives\, constraints\, and determin
 ants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avo
 id controversy on CEO pay\, implying they face significant constraints oth
 er than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints lead 
 to lower pay levels and more one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders ar
 e the main source of constraints\, suggesting that directors and investors
  disagree on how to maximize shareholder value. Both directors and investo
 rs believe intrinsic motivation and reputation to be stronger motivators t
 han incentive pay. Fairness is a significant determinant of pay. One refer
 ence point is shareholder returns\; it is deemed fair for CEOs to share ex
 ternal risks in contrast to optimal risk-sharing. A second is the CEO’s 
 perception of her value creation\; it is deemed fair to recognize good per
 formance even though she does not need additional consumption. The need to
  provide “recognition incentives” explains why flow pay responds to pe
 rformance\, even though CEOs have substantial “consumption incentives”
  from their equity holdings.
LOCATION:Zoom
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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