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SUMMARY:Sovereign swaps and sovereign default: Fundamental versus confiden
 ce risk
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210507
DTSTAMP:20260513T184806Z
UID:802c52ed37f12ef02b7e6d551334b02b831b6f45a8e9ec06923a5289
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Mark AGUIAR\, Princeton\nIn this chapter\, we use a benchmark 
 limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of soverei
 gn debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign d
 ebt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts\, we use the model to
  discuss debt overhang\, risk sharing\, and capital flows in an environmen
 t of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default and r
 enegotiation\; self-fulfilling debt crises\; and incomplete markets and th
 eir quantitative implications. We conclude with a brief assessment of the 
 current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future r
 esearch.
LOCATION:Zoom
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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