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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
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SUMMARY:Group-Managed Real Options
DTSTART:20210423T160000
DTEND:20210423T173000
DTSTAMP:20260407T081416Z
UID:d881a9855673c12a11abdccef98ebeb5b437d8716d37a81c00ea1675
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Lorenzo GARLAPPI\, University of British Columbia\nWe study a 
 standard real-option problem where decisions are made through voting by a 
 group of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. We show that\, when facing bot
 h investment and abandonment timing decisions\, the group behavior cannot 
 be replicated by that of a representative "median" member. As a result\, m
 embers' disagreement generates inertia---the group delays investment relat
 ive to a single-agent case---and underinvestment---the group rejects proje
 cts that are supported by the majority. These coordination frictions hold 
 in groups of any size\, for general voting protocols\, and are exacerbated
  by belief polarization.
LOCATION:Zoom
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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