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SUMMARY:IC Colloquium: Co-designing systems software and hardware for conf
 idential computing
DTSTART:20210211T150000
DTEND:20210211T160000
DTSTAMP:20260406T210206Z
UID:76fd15dd03a320176a109ae0f0ec8cf79711d9f9d948a52dc56d45d1
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:By: Andrew Baumann - Microsoft Research\n\nAbstract\nGeneral-p
 urpose “trusted computing” platforms have largely failed to inspire tr
 ust. Rather\, security for many cloud applications rests on a messy combin
 ation of cryptography\, reputation\, law\, and blind faith. As more comput
 ation moves to the cloud\, this is a serious concern: users rely on both t
 he cloud provider's staff and its globally-distributed software/hardware p
 latform not to expose any of their private data.\n\nIn this talk\, I'll fi
 rst introduce the notion of confidential computing\, which protects the co
 nfidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on
  which it runs (e.g.\, the cloud operator's host OS\, VMM and firmware)\, 
 before presenting two systems that implement it in different ways. The fir
 st\, Haven\, leverages Intel SGX hardware and a library OS to demonstrate 
 “shielded execution” of unmodified applications\, including SQL Server
  and Apache\, in an enclave. Insights from Haven informed the design of SG
 X\, which is now the basis of confidential computing offerings by major cl
 oud providers.\n\nHowever\, to implement SGX\, Intel extended the x86 arch
 itecture with an isolation mechanism approaching the complexity of an OS m
 icrokernel\, implemented by an inscrutable mix of silicon and microcode. W
 hile hardware-based security can improve performance and offer features th
 at are difficult or impossible to achieve in pure software\, hardware-only
  solutions are difficult to update\, either to patch security flaws or int
 roduce new features. Such updates are also dependent on the slowing deploy
 ment of new CPUs.\n\nThe second system\, Komodo illustrates an alternative
  approach. Komodo decouples the core hardware mechanisms such as memory en
 cryption\, address-space isolation and attestation from a privileged softw
 are monitor that in turn implements enclaves. The monitor is backed by a m
 achine-checkable proof of both functional correctness and high-level secur
 ity properties of enclave integrity and confidentiality. A prototype in ve
 rified assembly code on an ARM TrustZone platform demonstrates the practic
 ality of the approach.\n\nBio\nAndrew Baumann is a Principal Researcher at
  Microsoft Research\, Redmond\, which he joined in 2010 after completing a
  post-doctorate at ETH Zurich and a PhD at The University of New South Wal
 es. His research interests are operating systems and systems security\, wi
 th a particular focus on problems driven by hardware evolution\, or close 
 to the hardware/software\nboundary. His significant research projects incl
 ude the Barrelfish multikernel OS\, Drawbridge library OS\, and Haven trus
 ted cloud platform. Andrew has published at and served on the program comm
 ittees of conferences such as SOSP\, OSDI\, EuroSys\, NSDI\, ASPLOS\, and 
 Usenix ATC\, and served as program co-chair for VEE 2020. His work receive
 d best paper awards at OSDI 2014 and SOSP 2019\, and the SIGOPS hall of fa
 me award in 2020.\n\nMore information
LOCATION:https://epfl.zoom.us/j/83368442605?pwd=NE9zWEYrRjBCd0IxS0dJOERHZH
 QrQT09
STATUS:CONFIRMED
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