BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Memento EPFL//
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Financing the Litigation Arms Race
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20211112
DTSTAMP:20260407T145314Z
UID:e9edfaaaecf3f543638b6e9d5e1d232a499d878f570ff9ea868a5dcb
CATEGORIES:Conferences - Seminars
DESCRIPTION:Samuel Antill\, Harvard Business School\nUsing a dynamic model
  of litigation\, we show that the increasingly popular practice of third-p
 arty litigation financing has ambiguous welfare implications. A defendant 
 and a plaintiff bargain over a settlement payment. The defendant takes cos
 tly actions to avoid deadweight losses associated with large transfers to 
 the plaintiff. Litigation financing bolsters the plaintiff\, leading to la
 rger deadweight losses. However\, by endogenously deterring the defendant 
 from taking costly actions\, litigation financing can nonetheless improve 
 the joint surplus of the plaintiff and the defendant. In contrast to popul
 ar opinion\, litigation financing does not necessarily encourage high-risk
  frivolous lawsuits.
LOCATION:Zoom
STATUS:CONFIRMED
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR