

# FINANCE RESEARCH SEMINAR SUPPORTED BY UNIGESTION

## “The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts”

**Prof. Vikrant VIG**  
*London Business School*

### Abstract

In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers' money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.

**Friday, May 20, 2016, 13:15-14:45**  
Room 233, Internef building at the University of Lausanne

# The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts\*

Rainer Haselmann  
Goethe University

Thomas Kick  
Deutsche Bundesbank

Vikrant Vig  
London Business School

April 4, 2016

## ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers' money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.

**Keywords:** political economy, bailouts, state-owned enterprises, elections

**JEL Classification:** G21, G28, D72, D73

---

\*Author's contact addresses: Rainer Haselmann, Goethe University, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt, Germany, E-mail: haselmann@safe.uni-frankfurt.de; Thomas Kick, Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, 60431 Frankfurt, Germany, Email: thomas.kick@bundesbank.de; Vikrant Vig, London Business School, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom, Email: vvig@london.edu. We would like to thank Thorsten Beck, Emily Breza, Charles Goodhart, Reint Gropp, Hendrik Hakenes, Michael Koetter, Gyongyi Loranth, Steven Ongena, Jean-Charles Rochet, Andrei Shleifer and seminar participants at the Universities of Bonn, Geneva, and Zurich, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the C.R.E.D.I.T. Conference, the European Winter Finance Summit, the meeting of the European Economic Association, the LBS Spring Meeting, the German Finance Association Meeting, the Max Planck Society / German Research Foundation Conference, and the Tilburg Financial Stability Conference for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed here represent the authors' personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. The usual disclaimer on errors applies here as well.

# 1. Introduction

The optimal distance between regulators and regulated entities in the banking sector is one of the major issues in current discussions among academics and policy makers (Agarwal et al. 2014, Colliard 2013). For example, decisions on bank bailouts are often taken by politicians, and in many cases these politicians are closely linked to the banks in distress. Such links can range from personal relationships with top bankers to direct ownership relationships (in case of state-owned banks). On the one hand, such close proximity has the potential to improve the decision making process, as it provides politicians with good information about banks that get into distress. On the other hand, close proximity could imply that politicians' personal considerations distort the decision making process, which is clearly undesirable. Greater distance between banks and politicians would solve the issue, potentially at the expense of less informed decisions. Whether the informational benefits of proximity outweigh the costs of decisions distorted by personal interests is an empirical question that we aim to examine in our paper. Specifically, we analyze how the institutional design of the regime affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions.

Identifying the effects of distance between decision makers and affected financial institutions on bailout decisions is empirically challenging for various reasons: First, bank bailouts are (fortunately) rare events, which greatly complicates the empirical analysis. Second, there is a lack of counterfactuals against which bailout decisions can be evaluated. It is hard or even impossible to say what would have happened if a specific bank had not been bailed out. Third, bailout decisions are often distorted by too-big-too fail considerations, which further complicates the identification of empirical patterns and other drivers of the decisions. Finally, it is cumbersome to identify the distance between decision makers and affected financial institutions, which is necessary if one wants to analyze the effect of this distance on the decision making process.

The German savings bank sector provides a very interesting laboratory in which we can address these challenges. There is a close connection between savings banks and municipalities which formally own the banks. Local politicians tend to be members of the banks'

supervisory boards; most prominently, the city major or county administrator usually serves as chairman of the board. As such, he has a considerable amount of control over the bank, from which he plausibly derives both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, individual savings banks are interconnected by state-level associations. These associations operate an extensive safety net that has ensured that no savings bank in Germany has ever failed (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 2004). The safety net functions like an insurance scheme: Whenever one of the member institutions gets into distress, the other banks in the association have to step in and provide support. To prevent a recurrence of the distress event, the association imposes a so-called restructuring plan on the bank. The plan imposes tight restrictions on the operations of the bank and could, in the worst case, involve a merger of the bank with another bank in the association. The implementation of a restructuring plan is likely to constrain the power of the local politician who acts as a chairman of the bank; e.g., in the case of a distressed merger, he is very likely lose his position, and with it his influence on the operations of the bank.

The crucial feature of our setup is that local politicians can avoid formal distress cases by making use of taxpayers' money to support the bank in distress. In this case, the distress event is resolved without involvement of the association and no restructuring plan is implemented. Whether or not politicians intervene should ideally depend on economic considerations such as the future viability of the bank or implications of the intervention for the overall economy. As the politicians are close to the bank, they could benefit from informational advantages. However, as politicians have been found to maximize their probability of re-election, decisions could also depend on political considerations. Interventions could either be seen as negative, if voters perceive them as a waste of taxpayers' money, or as positive, if voters agree with the politician that tight restructuring measures should not be imposed on the bank. Regardless of voter preferences, we can test whether political considerations distort local politicians' decisions on bank bailouts by analyzing whether the

---

<sup>1</sup>For example, he can influence the allocation of earnings of the bank. Besides profit maximization, savings banks are mandated to serve the local community. Therefore, their earnings are often used to fund community projects, local events, or other activities within the municipality. Anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians often use these funds as a 'shadow budget' that is not controlled by the local parliament and hence gives them more freedom in the allocation of funds. Moreover, the compensations for their position as a chairman are one of the few perquisites that local politicians are allowed to keep for themselves (Die Welt 2012).

likelihood of interventions depends on the extent to which these interventions could affect the politician's probability of re-election.

To do so, we have to identify situations in which potential effects on the probability of re-election are particularly large. One such situation can be derived from the electoral cycle, as a great number of papers have documented that voters tend to forget events that occurred early on in the electoral cycle (Rogoff and Sibert 1988). Thus, if an election is imminent, interventions are more likely to have an impact on the politicians' probability of re-election. Another situation arises when political competition in the respective municipality is tight. With greater political competition, important events are more likely to actually affect the politician's probability of re-election. Finally, we also investigate whether politicians' ideology plays a role in decisions on bank bailouts.

We find that occurrence of distress events of German savings banks between 1994 and 2010 is not correlated with the electoral cycle of politicians. Thus, local politicians are not able to delay distress events until the election is over (see e.g. Brown and Dinç 2005, Liu and Ngo 2014). The decision of a local politician to inject tax payers money in a distressed banks does however depend on the electoral cycle. Conditional on distress (148 cases) politicians are about 30 percent less likely to inject capital into a distressed bank in the twelve months before an election as compared with the twelve months following an election. If there is high competition in the electoral process, a political bailout is 15 percent less likely. The findings are robust to the inclusion of a wide set of macroeconomic as well as bank-specific control variables. Overall, these findings are in line with the notion that decisions on bailouts by local politicians are distorted by personal considerations.

In the second part of the paper, we evaluate bail-outs organized by the local politicians and by the association using the election cycle as an instrument. Apart from their influence on the probability of a bailout by the politician, the dummies for the electoral cycle, for competitive counties and for conservative bank chairmen should not have an influence on a bank's future performance. Since we do not have accounting information on banks that were involved in a distressed merger following the event, we focus on a sample of banks that do not have a potential merger partner in their association. It could be that politicians are

not primarily concerned about the health of the bank itself, but rather care about the general economic development within their region. As a final piece of evidence, we compare the development of county-level macroeconomic variables around the distress events.

We find that restructuring activities are considerably less for those banks that are bailed-out by local politicians. Even local politicians should in principle be better informed about their respective banks, the restructuring by them does not result in better long-term performance. The comparison of the long-run performance of banks bailed out by the owner and banks bailed out by the association yields a consistent pattern: Banks that obtained support from the association perform better and are also better capitalized in the years following the distress event. We do not find differential effects on aggregate lending in counties with different types of events. However, following the distress event, the share of all loans within a given county that are extended by state banks increases in counties with owner bailouts and decreases in counties with support measures from the association. Both in counties with bailouts from the owner and in counties with support measures from the association, the GDP growth rate is relatively stable. Similarly, there are no significant changes in the share of employees within the population. Overall, we do not observe a better macroeconomic performance of counties in which the bank distress event was resolved by the owner as compared with the association. Fiscal costs of the bail-outs by local politicians, however, can be quite substantial in particular for rather small municipalities.

The German savings bank sector provides an ideal set-up for our analysis for several reasons. Firstly, savings banks in Germany represent a relatively homogeneous group. They operate in predefined geographic regions and are small in comparison to commercial banks. Consequently, bailout decisions concerning these banks are not distorted by too-big-to-fail arguments. Secondly, the savings bank organization has an extensive guarantee system that ensures the solvency and liquidity of its member institutions. Assuming that the organization's decisions on capital injections and distressed mergers are driven by economic considerations, they provide an ideal benchmark against which the decisions by local politicians can be evaluated. Thirdly, institutional quality in Germany is rather high (e.g., corruption is extremely low). Therefore, the impact of political and ideological factors

that we examine is not distorted by other institutional issues. Finally—and perhaps most importantly—Deutsche Bundesbank provides detailed information about distress events of savings banks that allows us to identify the capital injections of different parties as well as other restructuring measures around the event.

Our paper has important policy implications on the optimal proximity between banks and politicians or regulators that decide on bailouts. Although close proximity between politicians and banks might result in local knowledge for the decision maker, we document that outcomes are driven by personal incentives and ideology. A larger distance between policymakers and banks requires policymakers to rely on broad perspective. However, a larger distance is also likely to reduce personal stakes of politicians, and may therefore result in more efficient decisions on financial sector interventions. Our findings can be considered as relevant for the debate about the optimal level of banking supervision in the United States (Agarwal et al. 2014), or the discussion about a unified banking supervision within the Euro zone.<sup>2</sup> Since bailout decisions have dramatic consequences on the resulting market structure as well as on banks' risk taking<sup>3</sup>, an understanding of politicians' incentives is of major importance.

This paper adds to a literature examining how political variables affect bank distress events and bailout decisions.<sup>4</sup> The most related paper is Brown and Dinç (2005), who find for a sample of 21 emerging markets that failures of the largest banks in these countries are significantly more likely directly after an election as compared with the time before an election. While their paper is about the delay of bad news about bank failures prior to elections, we provide evidence that local politicians exploit their power to keep control of a bank if political circumstances allow it. Exploiting variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US, Liu and Ngo 2014 find that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. Halling

---

<sup>2</sup>See Colliard (2013) for a recent theoretical paper on the trade-off between better knowledge and biased incentives for local supervisors as compared with a central supervisor.

<sup>3</sup>See Dam and Koetter (2012), Gropp et al. (2011).

<sup>4</sup>See Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Pana and Wilson (2012), Puente (2012).

et al. (2014) document that politicians with less secure reelection prospects are more prone to take advantage of their captive banks, and that this effect is more pronounced in areas with high GDP per capita. Another example of political influence on bank bailout decisions is provided by Imai (2009). He shows that bank regulators in Japan delay declarations of bank insolvency in counties that support senior politicians of the party in power.<sup>5</sup> Dinç (2005) and Sapienza (2004) show that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks.<sup>6</sup>

Our paper also relates to the current literature on public bailout policies and moral hazard. Dam and Koetter (2012) show that bailout expectations among German banks that are partly explained by political variables influence the risk-taking behavior of these banks. Banks that are more likely to be bailed out engage in additional risk-taking. Gropp et al. (2011) argue that an increase of the bailout probability of a bank increases risk taking incentives of the competing banks since government guarantees distort competition.

Finally, our paper is related to a broader literature on the political economy of finance. Especially in the aftermath of the recent crisis, several papers examine how legislation on the financial industry is affected by lobbying of special interest groups and voter interests (Mian et al. 2010, 2012, McCarty et al. 2010). Lobbying by financial institutions affects the regulatory environment and might have negative consequences for financial stability (see Romer and Weingast 1991 for the U.S. in the 1980s). Kroszner and Strahan (1999) provide evidence that special interests of the financial industry affected the timing of bank branch deregulation in the U.S. Similarly, Nunez and Rosenthal (2004) show that both ideology and interest group interventions are important for U.S. legislation on bankruptcy. In another recent paper, Agarwal et al. (2012) examine whether the foreclosure decisions of banks during the recent crisis reflect these banks' political concerns and find that banks delayed foreclosures on mortgages located in districts whose representatives are members of the

---

<sup>5</sup>The influence of political incentives on bailout decisions is not constrained to the banking sector. Faccio et al. (2006) find that firms in 35 countries are more likely to be bailed out by the government if one of their top officers or a large shareholder is a member of the national government or parliament.

<sup>6</sup>For Germany, Vins (2008) and Englaier and Stowasser (2012) examine how savings banks adjust their behavior around elections. They find that layoffs of employees, closures of branches or merger activities of these banks are significantly less likely prior to an election. At the same time, savings banks increase their lending around elections in order to induce favorable economic outcomes for the politicians.



Financial Services Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. Again, politicians and bankers seem to affect each others actions. Compared to the papers mentioned above our study takes a somewhat different approach. Rather than investigating how decisions of politicians are influenced by the financial industry, we concentrate on politicians' incentives to keep control of a bank that is currently in their sphere of influence.

There is now a growing literature that examines the various economic trade-offs that accompany bank bailout decisions.<sup>7</sup> Proponents of bank bailouts argue that bank failures generate significant negative externalities that can have debilitating real effects. Thus, every effort should be made to avoid bank failures. Critics, on the other hand, voice concerns about the fiscal costs and moral hazard problems that accompany bank bailouts. Most of these discussions, however, omit an important factor that could affect bank bailout decisions, namely the personal interests of politicians involved in these decisions.<sup>8</sup> Politicians may follow their own interests (i.e., constituents and special interest pressure in order to increase their probability of re-election) or their own ideological preferences (e.g., the conservative principle of limited intervention in private markets; see Peltzman 1985, Poole and Rosenthal 1996).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next sections provides an overview of our institutional setup. In Section 3 we describe the construction of our dataset. Results on the influence of political variables on bailout decisions among German savings banks are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we examine how the consequences of bailouts depend on the type of the bailout. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

---

<sup>7</sup>See Merton (1977), Keeley (1990), Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Dam and Koetter (2012), Gropp et al. (2011). A detailed discussion of state-supported schemes for financial institutions is provided by Beck et al. (2010).

<sup>8</sup>A notable exception is Brown and Dinç (2005), who provide evidence that politicians in emerging countries delay bank failures until after the election.

## 2. Institutional background

### 2.1. Distress events in the savings bank sector

The focus of our paper is on savings banks, which grant about a quarter of all corporate and consumer loans in Germany (see Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 2010). In 2010, the savings bank sector consisted of 429 individual banks with a combined balance sheet total of € 1,084 billion, 15,600 branches, and about 250,000 employees. By statutes, savings banks do not compete one with the other as their operations are constrained to the municipalities that formally own them. The head of the respective municipal government, who is either a city mayor or a county administrator (referred to as local politician throughout the paper) acts as the chairman of the local savings bank's supervisory board.<sup>9</sup> Their position as a chairman of the board gives local politicians a strong influence on the operations of the bank (e.g., the appointment of bank management and the allocation of earnings).

Individual banks are connected by so-called savings bank associations that operate safety nets at the state level (referred to as the association throughout our paper).<sup>10</sup> Figure 1 illustrates the set-up of a savings bank association. The decision making board of the association consists of representatives from the individual banks (local politicians and bank executives) who are elected at general meetings of the association and serve for four- or five-year terms.<sup>11</sup> Savings bank associations collect data on the solvency and liquidity of their member institutions and transmit this information to the supervisor. Furthermore, they operate guarantee funds that function like an insurance scheme: If one of the member institutions gets into distress, the other banks in the association have to step in and provide support, where the main support measures are capital injections and debt guarantees.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup>The supervisory board of a savings bank has about 15 members. The members besides the chairman are representatives from local authorities and savings bank employees, where representatives from local authorities are in most cases politicians from the local parliament and account for about two thirds of the board members.

<sup>10</sup>The associations do not exactly match the 16 German states (i.e., there are only 12 associations). For example, four of the former GDR states form a single association. The twelve state-level associations are themselves connected in the "Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband" at the federal level.

<sup>11</sup>General meetings of the association are attended by the chairmen of the individual banks, the directors, and one additional board member per bank. Among themselves, the attendees of the general meeting elect the members of the board of the association (see, e.g., Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2009).

<sup>12</sup>The savings bank sector operates a three-layer liability scheme, where the regional guarantee funds con-

Support is provided under the condition that the bank follows a restructuring plan which is proposed by the association. As often emphasized by the savings bank organization, the extensive safety net has ensured that no savings bank in Germany has ever failed. The claim is that distressed savings banks will always be bailed out by the association.

An interesting feature of this institutional setup is that local politicians can avoid formal distress cases by making use of taxpayers' money to support a savings bank that gets into distress. In this paper, we investigate how local politicians' decisions on support measures depend on political variables such as the time to the next election. To clearly illustrate the role of local politicians in our set-up, we outline the sequencing of decisions in case of bank distress below:

- The most common reason for distress events of saving banks is the default of one or more big borrowers of the savings bank. In case of material losses that could induce a capital shortfall below the regulatory minimum the savings bank has to inform the board of the association.
- The board of the association meets with the bank's management and its supervisory board to obtain background information on the distress event. Afterwards, the board of the association decides on the kind and the volume of support measures for the bank. Moreover, it decides on a restructuring plan to be imposed on the bank.
- As the association wants to avoid that it has to step in again at a later point, all support measures are conditional on the restructuring plan which has to be accepted by the bank's management and supervisory board. The plan may include an organizational restructuring, a dismissal of the management and—in the worst case—a merger of the bank with another bank in the association (so-called distressed merger). As it imposes severe restriction on the bank's operations, the plan is likely to limit the local politician's influence on the bank.<sup>13</sup>
- At this point, local politicians (serving as chairmen of the supervisory board) can step

---

stitute the first layer. In the second layer, state-level association would have to step in one for the other, and in the third layer there is a joint liability scheme with central savings banks ("Landesbanken") and central building societies ("Landesbausparkassen").

<sup>13</sup>E.g., in the case of a distressed merger, the politician is very likely to lose his position as a chairman.

in and prevent the implementation of a tight restructuring plan. If the local parliament agrees, they can use taxpayers' money to save the bank in distress. In this case, the distress event is resolved without involvement of the association, and the implementation of a restructuring plan is not required.<sup>14</sup>

- In a few cases (i.e., 4 of the 148 distress events in our sample), support measures are jointly provided by the association and local authorities. These distress cases tend to be organized by the association.

In summary, while savings banks in distress will always be bailed out, there are two different ways in which the bailout can be organized. On the state level, the association operates a safety net for these banks. The decision on support measures and restructuring plan is made by the board of the association, which consists of politicians and bank executives from other municipalities covered by the respective association. The board members have to rely on a broad perspective when deciding on support measures. Due to the distance between their own jurisdiction and the savings bank's municipality they do not derive any benefits from controlling the bank.

On the local level, the politicians who chair the supervisory board may step in by injecting taxpayers' money. Such interventions allow them to prevent the implementation of restructuring activities by the association. This could be efficient, since local politicians, compared with the board of the association, are much closer to the bank and thus have better information on the underlying causes of the distress event. Moreover, they might know better what a restructuring of the bank would mean for the local economy (which they govern in their function as city major or county administrator). However, decisions by local politicians could be distorted by personal considerations. Restructuring activities imposed by the association are likely to reduce the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary benefits that local politicians can derive from their position as a chairman. For example, their ability to influence the allocation of earnings—which gives them access to funds that are not controlled by the local parliament—is likely to be constrained. Such considerations might lead the

---

<sup>14</sup>We will show in the subsequent section that bailouts organized by local politicians are indeed characterized by considerably less restructuring compared with bailouts organized by the association.

politicians to intervene also in cases where tight restructuring (or even a distressed merger) would actually be the more efficient option.

## **2.2. The German electoral system**

Since supervisory boards of our sample banks are chaired by local politicians, we briefly summarize the German political system. Germany is organized as a parliamentary democracy with three layers of government: The federal republic, 16 states (“Bundesländer”), and 402 county districts consisting of 295 rural counties that are headed by local administrators, and 107 urban municipalities that are headed by city mayors. Separate elections on each layer take place in regular intervals.

The focus of our paper is on the elections in rural countries and urban municipalities, for which the laws are enacted at the state level. While the electoral cycle for county / city parliaments is five years in almost all German states (with the exception of Bavaria and Bremen, that have a six year and a four year cycle, respectively), there are some differences in the elections of local heads of government. In many German states, mayors or district administrators are directly elected in separate elections that take place on the same day as the election of the local parliament. Our focus is on parliamentary elections at the county or city level. In most cases these election take place on the same day as the election of the mayor / county administrator.

## **3. Data and Descriptives**

Our analysis covers the German savings bank sector over the period from 1994 to 2010. We combine several confidential datasets from the Bundesbank’s supervisory and statistics departments to compile a unique dataset that allows us to cleanly identify distress events of savings banks. In the first part of this section we explain the construction of this distress event variable. In the second part we describe bank-level and macroeconomic variables. The final part introduces the political variables and explains the motivation behind them.

### 3.1. Distress events

We define distress events as cases where savings banks receive external support from the owner and / or the association in response to a capital shortfall (in the form of capital injections and / or guarantees), or when it is taken over by another savings bank in a distressed merger. Identifying distress events in the savings bank sector is cumbersome, since some types of support measures cannot be identified from banks' balance sheets (e.g., guarantees provided by third parties do not show up in the balance sheet). Furthermore many savings banks have been involved in mergers without being in distress. We therefore combine four sources from Deutsche Bundesbank's supervisory data to cleanly identify distress events; that is, the Bundesbank's prudential data base for banking supervision (BAKIS), the monthly balance sheet statistics (BISTA), the borrowers' statistics, and the Bundesbank's data base on distress events (see Appendix for a detailed description of the four underlying datasets). Additionally, we consult local media coverage on distress events obtained from the GENIOS data base in order to verify our event dates.

First, we identify capital support measures by the owner (i.e., local politicians) by exploiting a peculiarity in savings banks' balance sheets. For historical reasons, the equity of these banks usually consists solely of contingency funds (so called "Sicherheitsrücklage"). These funds were originally provided by the owner of the bank in the year of foundation and then accumulated over the years out of the bank's retained earnings. However, if the savings bank—besides its equity in the contingency funds—also has subscribed capital unequal to zero, then this usually indicates an undisclosed participation of the bank owner (so-called "stille Einlage"). We therefore define an increase in subscribed capital that cannot be explained by takeovers or restructuring of equity positions as capital injections from the bank owner.<sup>15</sup> By using historical data of subscribed capital from the monthly balance sheet data (BISTA) we are able to identify the size of the capital injection as well as the particular month in which the event occurred.

---

<sup>15</sup>In some German states the savings bank law allows undisclosed participation not only from the owner of the bank, but also from the savings bank association. However, this is the rare exception and we rule out these cases using the BAKIS database as described in the subsequent paragraph.

Second, we code capital support measures by the savings bank association. Whenever one of the associations provides support to a savings bank—most often in the form of guarantees—this event is recorded in the so called “Sonderdatenkatolog 1” of the BAKIS database.<sup>16</sup> The data source is, however, only available at annual frequency. To determine the month of these events within a given year, we consult two further databases: First, we obtain data on capital adequacy ratios from the monthly balance sheet database BISTA;<sup>17</sup> and second, we identify large write-offs from the borrowers’ loan statistics that is available on a quarterly basis.<sup>18</sup> We are therefore able to verify our identified events from two distinct Bundesbank data sources. In those cases in which we can only identify the respective quarter, we always assign the mid month of the respective quarter as the event month. We cross-check our event dates with media coverage on local distress events obtained from the GENIOS data base and find that the dates are broadly consistent with the coverage in the local press. There are some cases where savings banks received support from the association and the owner within the same year (four cases); we assign these events to the source that provided the larger amount of funds.<sup>19</sup>

Third, we obtain information on distressed mergers from the Bundesbank database on distress events.<sup>20</sup> A takeover of a distressed savings bank is organized by the savings bank association which identifies another savings bank in close geographic proximity to acquire the bank in distress. While capital injections as well as provisions of guarantees occur right after the bank falls short of regulatory capital (the distress event), there is generally a time gap between the actual distress event and the merger. In order to identify the actual date of

---

<sup>16</sup>Banks are legally bound to report this information to Bundesbank and BaFin. In contrast to pure balance sheet information this dataset contains confidential supervisory information.

<sup>17</sup>Large increases in the capital adequacy ratio in a certain month indicate that the savings bank received capital support at this time. Capital adequacy ratios in the BISTA are available on a monthly basis until the end of 2007, and on a quarterly basis from 2008 on.

<sup>18</sup>Large write-offs on loans in a given month indicate that the savings bank experienced a distress event at this time. Loan portfolio write-off data is available from 2002 on in the borrowers’ statistics; therefore, it can be used to double-check the information on the timing of bailout events, in particular by the banking association, for roughly half of the time-period of our dataset. For the period before 2002 we have to rely on the evolution of the capital adequacy ratio in order to identify the timing of the distress event within a year.

<sup>19</sup>All results also hold if we exclude these cases.

<sup>20</sup>As the distress database is only available until 2006, we define distressed mergers in the years 2007-2010 as passive mergers where the bank that was taken over experienced a severe distress event in the three years before the merger (i.e., a moratorium, a capital support measure, or a very low capital ratio).

the distress event we once more rely on large write-offs from the borrowers' loan statistics (as described above). For the savings bank that had a distressed merger before 2002 (the year when the borrowers' statistics database was initiated) we consult local media coverage from the GENIOS data base where it is available. For the remaining cases we have to make an assumption about the date of the distress event: We assume that the distress event occurred in December of the year before the actual merger took place.<sup>21</sup> As we are mainly interested in identifying whether a distress event took place before or after an election, this assumption is critical only for those cases where the distress event occurred within an election year. These are very few cases and excluding them does not affect our main findings.<sup>22</sup>

Overall, we identify 148 distress events of German savings banks during our sample period from 1994 to 2010. Among these 148 distress event, more than one third was resolved by capital injections from the owner (55 cases). The remaining 93 events were dealt with by the association. Out of these 93 cases, 44 banks experienced a distressed merger in the year following the distress event (see Table 1, Panel A). A definition of all variables is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In Figure 2 we present the distribution of the distress events over time. The distress events are relatively evenly distributed over the sample period and not related to a particular recession.

### **3.2. Bank and macroeconomic variables**

We use bank and macroeconomic control variables to account for potential differences between banks that were bailed out by the owner and banks for which the distress event was resolved by the association. Annual bank balance sheet data for all German savings banks is based on the unconsolidated balance sheet and income statement reports provided by the

---

<sup>21</sup>We have also experimented with setting the month at March, June or September of the year before the distressed merger. Our results are unaffected by this choice.

<sup>22</sup>Out of the distress events resolved by the saving banks association, we have to make an assumption for seven events that occur within an election year. Assuming that these events took place in December actually biases our results against finding a significant effect of the electoral cycle, as some of them might have happened before the election and our main argument is that directly before an election support measures by the association are relatively more likely than support measures by the owner. Hence, assuming that these events took place in December is the most conservative assumption we can make.



BAKIS database.<sup>23</sup> Table 1, Panel B, provides sample statistics for balance sheet items used in the empirical analysis. We compare the values of banks that had a distress event during our sample period with those of the average savings bank (633 in total). Banks that received capital injections from the owner are larger than average, both in terms of total assets as well as in terms of total assets divided by county-level GDP, while banks that were supported by the association are of similar size as the average bank.<sup>24</sup> Further, the bank's regional market share (proxied by the share of branches within the county) is slightly higher than the sample mean for banks that received support from the owner and significantly lower than average for banks that received support from the association. Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that banks that are relatively important (as measured by size) tend to be bailed out by the owner.

Not surprisingly, the ratio of total equity to total assets is lower for banks that experienced either type of support measure. Moreover, these banks also have a lower ROA and a higher ratio of non-performing loans to customer loans on average. In contrast, the deposit ratio (savings deposits, term deposits, and time deposits to total assets) is significantly lower for banks that received support from the owner. The table further reports statistics on the amount of loans granted by the bank to its owner divided by county-level GDP, which is slightly higher for banks that obtain support measures from the owner as compared to those banks that are supported by the association.

We define an additional variable that we use in the empirical analysis for the 148 distressed cases. The dummy variable *Bank Chairman in Ass. Board* indicates whether the distressed bank's chairman is also a member of the board of the association.<sup>25</sup> As the board of the association makes the decision on potential support measures by the association, the bank's chairman might be able to influence this decision if he is a member of this board.

---

<sup>23</sup>We apply a very thorough merger treatment to the dataset: After the merger of two banks we artificially create a third bank (for the time after the merger) in the dataset. Note that the merger treatment causes the total number of banks in the dataset to exceed the maximum number of banks in a given time period.

<sup>24</sup>A definition of all variables is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix.

<sup>25</sup>Information on the composition of the boards of the association at each point in time is hand-collected from the respective annual reports of the associations. We carefully match association board members with chairmen of the individual banks by comparing both the name of the chairman as well as the county/city he is from.

Overall, the politician is also member of the association board in 20 percent of the savings banks considered.

Our regional variables are gathered from various data sources. We obtain information on county level GDP per capita, its growth rate as well as the ratio of government debt to GDP on the county / city level from the 16 German State Statistical Offices. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Panel C of Table 1. On average, banks experiencing a bailout by the politician are located in a municipality with lower GDP growth in comparison to the municipalities of banks that are bailed out by the association. Furthermore, municipalities where politicians conduct bailouts have a higher GDP per capita and are less indebted than the average municipality.

### **3.3. Political variables**

We analyze whether political considerations affect the way in which distress events are resolved. On the one hand, it is possible that voters perceive an intervention by local politicians as a waste of taxpayers' money. The savings bank organisation has an extensive safety net in place, so that convincing voters of the economic necessity of using local funds to save the bank appears rather difficult. Following this argumentation, interventions by local politicians would decrease their chances to be re-elected. On the other hand, voters could be in favour of having an independent savings bank within the municipality. This would imply that interventions by local politicians are popular among voters and hence increase the politicians chances of re-election.

Irrespective of voters preferences, such political considerations should not affect the decision making process. Decisions on bank bailouts should be based on economic considerations such as the banks future viability or implications for the overall economy, and not on personal considerations of the involved politicians. As long as the occurrence of distress events themselves is independent of political considerations, also the way in which the distress events are resolved should be independent of such considerations. Hence, any influence of political considerations on the likelihood of interventions by politicians can be

seen as a sign of distorted decision making.

To analyze whether political considerations matter we identify situations in which they should be more important. Several papers have documented that voters tend to forgive events that occurred early on in the electoral cycle (e.g., Rogoff and Sibert 1988). In other words, if an election is imminent, interventions by politicians are much more likely to affect their probability of re-election. Thus, the timing of the occurrence of a bank distress event in the electoral cycle could affect the decision of a politician in case she / he cares about re-election.

For the empirical analysis, we hand-collect information on the identity and the position of distressed savings banks' chairmen from the banks' annual reports as published in the *Bundesanzeiger*.<sup>26</sup> We use various internet sources in order to determine the party membership of these chairmen. Results and dates of elections on the county / city level are obtained from the 16 German State Statistical Offices. We carefully match counties and cities with municipal owners of our sample banks.<sup>27</sup> In this way, we are able to obtain information on the elections in all municipalities that own one of our sample banks.

We define *Electoral Cycle Dummies* as follows: The dummy variable  $D(0-12\text{ months})$  takes a value of one during the 12 months after the local election and zero otherwise. The dummy variables  $D(12-24\text{ months})$  takes a value of one for the time from the 12<sup>th</sup> to the 24<sup>th</sup> month following the local election and zero otherwise. The dummy variables  $D(24-36\text{ months})$  and  $D(36-48\text{ months})$  are defined accordingly. The 12 months preceding an election serve as the benchmark category against which the other time periods are evaluated.<sup>28</sup>

A second proxy for political constraints is the degree of political competition in the

---

<sup>26</sup>This information is available online from 2006 onwards ([www.bundesanzeiger.de](http://www.bundesanzeiger.de)). For earlier observations, we consulted microfiche versions of the *Bundesanzeiger* provided by the university and regional library in Bonn.

<sup>27</sup>In cases where several municipalities jointly own a savings bank there is generally one dominant county or city that owns the largest share of the bank. We account for this by matching the respective bank to the county or city in which its headquarters are located.

<sup>28</sup>The length of the electoral cycle is different for the states of Bremen (4 years) and Bavaria (6 years, see Section 2). For distress cases that occur in Bremen,  $D(36-48\text{ months})$  is always set equal to 0. For distress cases that occur in Bavaria,  $D(36-48\text{ months})$  is set equal to 1 in the first and in the second year following an election.

respective city / county. If competition between different parties within the municipality is tight, a decrease in the probability of re-election is more material in the sense that it can actually imply that the politician is indeed not re-elected. We thus define the variable *Competitive County* as follows: First, we calculate the vote share margin between the first and the second party within the county / city from the respective state election.<sup>29</sup> Second, we then define a dummy that is equal to one if the vote share margin is smaller than the median and zero otherwise. The intuition behind this dummy is the following: The smaller the vote share margin between the first and the second party, the more intense the political competition and the more effective the disciplining role voters can exert on politicians.

A politician's bailout decisions might be influenced by his / her ideology. To proxy for a politician's ideology we define the dummy variable *Cons. Bank Chairman*: The variable is equal to one if the chairman of the bank is a member of the German conservative party ("CDU/CSU"). A fundamental conservative principle is the one of limited government intervention in markets. If politicians act according to this principle, we would expect less capital injections from the owner if the chairman of the bank is a CDU/CSU member.

## **4. Political determinants of bank bailouts**

In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We start by investigating whether the timing of bank distress events can be explained by the electoral cycle by applying a hazard model. We proceed by modeling the owner's decision to bail out a bank conditional on distress. Finally, we end the section by examining the impact of the fiscal situation of the municipality as well as other political factors on the owner's bailout decision.

### **4.1. The electoral cycle and the timing of distress events**

One important assumption for our identification strategy is that the occurrence of distress events per se does not depend on the electoral cycle. Figure 3 displays the distribution of all

---

<sup>29</sup>We use county/city level state election results as a proxy for political competitiveness as these elections are relatively similar across states so that results from different states can easily be compared to one another.

148 distress events over the electoral cycle. We do not observe a clear relationship between bank distress events and the electoral cycle in Germany. This is in contrast to findings for emerging economies (Brown and Dinç 2005), which might be explained by a strong supervision of the banking sector, requiring the disclosure of monthly capital adequacy ratios. In such a supervisory environment bankers do not have the opportunity to delay distress events.

We formally test whether the electoral cycle influences the timing of bank distress events by using a hazard model. Potentially, if banks know about differences in politicians' willingness to bail them out, they might have an incentive to delay distress events. We define the period from the beginning of our sample in 1994 until a distress event as the time until distress for each bank. Thus, the hazard rate,  $h(t)$ , is the probability that a bank distress occurs at time  $t$ , given that no distress occurred until then. Following Brown and Dinç (2005) and Liu and Ngo (2014), we test whether distress events depend on the electoral cycle, using an exponential hazard model:<sup>30</sup>

$$h_i(t) = \exp(\beta'_0 \cdot x_{it-1} + \beta'_1 \cdot \text{Electoral Cycle}_{it} + \beta'_2 \cdot \text{time}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{association}_i) \quad (1)$$

where  $x_{it-1}$  denotes a vector of covariates for bank  $i$  at time or duration  $t$ . The vector  $\text{Electoral Cycle}_{it}$  includes our dummies for the electoral cycle that are equal to 1 if the bank's accounting year  $t$  falls into the respective period in the electoral cycle. The regression also includes time and association fixed effects. Since the cycles of the local elections are to a large extent synchronized, year fixed effects would absorb the  $\text{Electoral Cycle}_{it}$ . Therefore, we define time fixed effects which take the value of 1 during one of the entire cycles (5 year intervals) and 0 otherwise.<sup>31</sup> Standard errors are clustered by year and robust to heteroscedasticity. We also employed a simple probit model instead of the hazard model, which yields very similar results.

The regressions include all bank-year observations for savings banks that had a distress

---

<sup>30</sup>Results are very similar when we use a Cox proportional hazard model instead of the exponential hazard model.

<sup>31</sup>County / city elections take place at the same point in time within a state, but these points may differ across states. However, several German states have their county / city elections in the same year, so that we identify four main electoral cycles that correspond to the relevant elections for most of our sample banks. These cycles are 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2010.

event throughout our sample period, starting in 1994. Table 2 presents our findings for the relationship between distress events and the electoral cycle. In column 1 we include only the *Electoral Cycle<sub>it</sub>* dummies. None of the dummies are significant. Thus, there is no relationship between the timing of distress events of state-owned banks and the electoral cycle in Germany. This observation is unchanged if we add control variables in column 2. The control variables indicate that distress is less likely when banks are large (measured by market share), profitable, and well-capitalized. Results remain unchanged when we add time dummies in column 3 and association dummies in column 4: There is no statistical relationship between the electoral cycle and distress events suggesting that politicians are **not** able to endogenously affect the timing of distress events. Otherwise we would expect them to delay the occurrence of the distress event until after the election (see Brown and Dinç 2005, Liu and Ngo 2014).

Having shown that the occurrence of distress events does not depend on the electoral cycle, we now turn to politicians' decisions to inject money into a distressed bank.

## **4.2. The impact of the electoral cycle on the bailout decision by politicians**

Figure 4<sup>32</sup> and Table 1, Panel D displays the frequency distribution of owner bailouts over the electoral cycle. The relative frequencies of capital injections by politicians display a clear pattern over the electoral cycle: In the 12 months before the election, the share of owner-bailouts in all distress events is considerably lower (15.4 %) than in the 12 months following the election (50.0 %). Only one out of 55 cases of capital support by the owner occurs in the six months directly preceding an election. This suggests that politicians are reluctant to use taxpayers' money in order to support a savings bank in distress right before an election. The percentage of capital injections from the owner in total distress events is shown in Figure A.1. Again, there is a clear indication that the probability of injecting

---

<sup>32</sup>We used a 12 months interval in Figure 3 as we cannot identify the exact timing within the year for some distressed merger events. When we add these events to the first half of the year we create an artificial pattern of more events in the first six months compared to the second six months (and the opposite if we add these events to the second part of the year).

money into a distressed bank is considerably lower in the year before the election.

To test this pattern more formally, we use a linear probability model in order to assess the relative likelihood of the two possible outcomes: bailout by the politician and support measures by association. We use the 148 distress cases in our sample to estimate the following equation:<sup>33</sup>

$$Event\ Type_{ijkt} = association_j + time_t + POL'_{kt}\beta + B'_{it-1}\gamma + C'_{kt-1}\delta + \varepsilon_{ijkt}, \quad (2)$$

where  $i$  denotes the individual bank,  $j$  the association to which the bank belongs,  $k$  the county or city of the bank, and  $t$  the year in which the distress event occurred. The dependent variable is a dummy called  $Event\ Type_{ijkt}$  and takes the value of one if the bank distress is resolved by the politician and the value of zero if the distress is resolved by the association.<sup>34</sup> The political variables include dummy variables for the electoral cycle, the political competition within the county and the ideology of the politician. They are summarized in the vector  $POL_{kt}$ . Bank level control variables are denoted by the vector  $B_{it-1}$  and include the bank's relative size to county / city GDP, the capital ratio, the return on assets, the non-performing loans ratio, the market share, and the deposit ratio. They are lagged by one year in order to obtain pre-event values. Regional control variables are also lagged by one year and include the level and the growth rate of county-level GDP per capita. They are summarized in the vector  $C_{kt-1}$ . In our most stringent specification, we include two sets of dummy variables, one of them indicating the association to which the bank belongs and the other one indicating time dummies. The specification further includes a random error term  $\varepsilon_{ijkt}$ . Standard errors are clustered by year and robust to heteroscedasticity in all our regressions.<sup>35</sup> The primary variables of interest are the dummies for the electoral cycle in the vector  $POL_{kt}$ .

Table 3 presents estimation results for Equation (2). We start with a benchmark specification without any political variables in column 1. The regression shows that larger banks

---

<sup>33</sup>Using a nonlinear logit model gives results that are very similar to the results from our linear specification (see Table A.2).

<sup>34</sup>Cases in which both the association and the owner inject money into the bank are classified as the category that contributed the larger amount of capital. See Section 3.1 for details.

<sup>35</sup>Alternatively we cluster standard errors by association. This results in lower standard errors.

or banks with a higher deposit ratio are less likely to receive capital injections from the owner. The opposite is true for banks with a higher local market share. One could argue that these banks are more important for regional development within the county and therefore the owner has a greater interest in keeping control of the bank and wants to avoid a painful restructuring plan or even a distressed merger. Finally, the regression shows that counties or cities with higher GDP per capita growth are less likely to use taxpayers' money in order to bail out a savings bank in distress.

Findings in column 2 confirm our descriptive analysis. The electoral cycle seems to have a strong influence on the type of the bailout for a savings bank in distress. In the twelve months before an election, the probability that a politician resolves a distressed bank is 23 to 36 percent lower as compared to the other years in the electoral cycle (column 2). This finding is remarkable as it suggests that decisions on bank bailouts by local politicians are distorted by personal considerations about their probability to be re-elected.

Furthermore, there is evidence that also other political variables matter. Politicians are about 15 percent less likely to support a distressed bank if political competition within the county or city of the bank is relatively high (column 3). This is in line with the personal interest explanation: Voters exert more discipline if the political competition is more intense. Although a politician might want to prevent restructuring of a distressed bank in order to keep it under her control, she cannot do so if this will be perceived as a waste of taxpayers' money and hence be punished in the next election. The more intense the political competition, the more severe the threat of punishment. Further, column 3 shows that capital injections from the owner are about 18 percent less likely if the bank chairman is a member of the conservative party, which is in line with the conservative ideology of limited state interventions. The results hold when we run a horse-race of all political variables in column 4. The explanatory power of the model significantly improves when the political variables are included: The  $R^2$  increases from 0.240 in the benchmark case to 0.341. The results are further robust to the inclusion of association dummies (column 6).



### 4.3. Fiscal and other factors affecting the bailout decision of politicians

How does the fiscal situation of the local municipality affect the decisions of politicians to resolve bank distress? On the one hand, politicians of municipalities with a high level of fiscal debt are less capable to further increase spending. On the other hand, a high level of fiscal debt could indicate a politician's attitude for fiscal discipline.

As indicated in the previous section, politicians are less likely to support banks whose assets are relatively large as a fraction of the municipalities' GDP (see also Table 4, columns 1 and 2). Since bailouts of large banks tend to be expensive, this result is likely to reflect fiscal boundaries of local politicians. Once we include a measure for the fiscal deficit of the community we obtain a significantly negative relationship: Politicians of highly indebted communities are less likely to resolve bank distress (columns 3 and 4). This is an example of the disciplining effect of fiscal federalism.

We examine further variables that might affect politicians' willingness to bail out banks. In columns 5 and 6, we include a proxy for personal connections between the association board and the board of the respective bank in distress (*Bank Chairman in Ass. Board*). This variable is equal to one if the chairman of the bank is also a member in the board of the association. This board decides on support measures provided by the association and it is possible that the politician tries to use her/his influence to obtain support without further restructuring. If this would be the case, we would expect that politicians are less likely to use taxpayers' money to resolve distressed banks. In a way, this variable tests whether the decision process at the association is rather transparent and follows pre-determined rules, or whether it is prone to favoritism. The dummy is insignificant, which illustrates once again the rather transparent decision process of the savings bank associations. If the association was prone to favoritism we would have expected a significantly negative coefficient for this dummy.

Next, we test for a link between the bailout decision and funding that the respective municipality obtains from the distressed bank. Politicians might have incentives to prefer control over a savings bank if this bank provides a large fraction of loans to the politicians'

municipalities. We include the amount of loans that the municipality is borrowing from the distressed bank divided by local GDP. We detect no significant relationship between this measure and the probability of the owner to resolve a bank in distress (columns 7 and 8).

Finally, the horse race in columns 9 and 10 shows that the political variables exert a strong and persistent influence on politicians' decisions to inject money into distressed banks.

## **5. Consequences of political bailouts**

Having shown that decision on bank bailouts by local politicians are distorted by personal considerations, we now examine whether this has implications for the banks' long-run performance or macroeconomic developments within the respective municipalities. Comparing banks or municipalities in which the distress event was resolved by the association with those in which it was resolved by the owner could be prone to selection concerns, since interventions by local politicians could be correlated with factors that also affect the future long-run performance of the bank or the macroeconomic environment. To address this concern, we use the electoral cycle as an instrument for interventions by local politicians.

### **5.1. Bank performance following bailouts**

#### **5.1.1. Descriptives**

We start with descriptive statistics for changes in key variables of banks that experienced a distress event. Table 5 illustrate differences in characteristics of distressed banks that were resolved by local politicians and the association before and after the actual distress event. Specifically, we present the growth rates in customer loans, employees, personal expenditures and the number of branches of the bank around the bailout events. As we have no accounting information on the operations of savings banks that were merged with other banks, we have less observations for the post bailout statistics.

By comparing observable bank characteristics of these two bailout types, we get an idea whether local politicians tend to inject funds in specific type of banks. The first (second) section of the table shows the average annual growth rate in all years (five years) prior to the event of those banks that experienced the respective type of distress event. For example, banks that received support from the association during our sample period had an average customer loan growth rate of 6.3 % in the years between the beginning of our sample period in 1994 and the year of the distress event. Similarly, column 2 shows that the average growth rate was 5.8 % for those banks that received capital injections from the owner and column 3 shows that the difference between the two groups of banks is not significant. In the bailout year, the average growth rate is significantly lower than the pre-event average for both types of events. However, the decline in the average growth rate is more than twice as large if the funds are provided by the association, and column 3 shows that customer loan growth in the bailout year is significantly higher if the bank is saved by the owner. The effect is similar in the year following the bailout, in the second and even in the third year after the bailout. In line with the implementation of a tight restructuring plan, also the development of the number of employees, and—to a lesser extent—personal expenditures and the number of branches indicates more restructuring activities for bailouts that are organized by the association.

Next, we investigate whether these differences in restructuring activities have consequences for the long-run performance of banks following the distress event. On the one hand, performance could be negatively affected if the politician tries to prevent necessary restructuring measures in order to maintain his influence on the bank's operations. On the other hand, less restructuring might be optimal if politicians have better information about the situation of 'their' bank. Comparing the long-run performance of banks that received support from either politicians or the association helps us to further distinguish between these two explanations.

Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 6. For each bank, we calculate the four-year change as compared with the bailout year for several key variables, the average between the four-year change and the five-year change, and so on (up to seven years). We then

average these changes across banks that received support from either the association or the owner and compare the values for these two groups of banks. The comparison yields a clear picture: Irrespective of the chosen horizon, banks that obtained support from the association improved their performance considerably more in the long run as compared to banks that received support from the owner. For example, the capital ratio rises significantly more for banks whose distress case was resolved by the association. Interestingly, only banks that received support from the association are able to considerably reduce their non-performing loans ratio. Similarly, there is a higher reduction in the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans for banks that obtained support from the association. Finally, the return on assets for this group of banks increased by about 0.2 percent more on average as compared to banks that obtained support from the owner.

### **5.1.2. Addressing selection**

There are two potential sources of selection bias that might explain why banks that receive support from the association perform better in the long run as compared to banks that receive support from the owner. First, following the distress event, we do not have accounting information for banks that experienced a distressed merger. The association is likely to organize distressed mergers for the ‘worst’ distress cases. Hence, comparing the remaining association bailouts to the average owner bailout might suffer from a bias. Second, there might be unobserved variables that jointly affect the politician’s bailout decision and the future performance of the bank.

To circumvent the first issue, we restrict the sample to those savings banks that do not have a potential merger partner. In particular, these are all savings banks that do not have another savings bank in close geographic proximity that has at least 1.5 times the size of the bank in distress (in terms of total assets) as well as a capital ratio and an ROA higher than the median in our sample.<sup>36</sup> In this way, we obtain a subsample of 56 distress cases for which

---

<sup>36</sup>We define a savings bank to be in ‘close geographic proximity’ of a bank in distress if it is located in a county neighboring the one of the distressed bank. Further, we altered the criteria for a potential merger partner and found that our results do not depend on the exact definition (in particular, we tried different size cutoffs (same size, two times the size) and omitted the capital ratio and ROA criteria in alternative specifications).

we are able to obtain five-year changes in the key variables from the previous section.<sup>37</sup> By only focusing on this subsample, we ensure that the comparison between association and owner bailouts is a fair comparison.

To address the second issue, we use the fact that the electoral cycle is an important determinant for local politicians' bailout decisions. Apart from their influence on the probability of a bailout by the politician, the dummies for the electoral cycle should not have an influence on a bank's future performance. Therefore, we can use these variables as instruments. We start by illustrating our identification strategy graphically in Figure 5. In Panel A and B we display the absolute and the relative frequency distribution of capital injections from the owner across the electoral cycle within the subsample of banks that do not have a potential merger partner. The pattern in the subsample is similar to the one in the full sample (see Figures 4 and A.1): The probability for a capital injection from the owner is considerably higher after the election as compared to the period before the election. More specifically, there are only 6 cases of capital injections from the owner in the two years before the election, while there are 19 cases in the two years after the election.

In Panels C to F, we display average values for five-year changes in the bank performance measures from above (i.e., capital ratio, non-performing loans ratio, ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans, and ROA), grouped by the electoral cycle.<sup>38</sup> In general, there should not be a relationship between banks' future performance and the timing of the distress event within the electoral cycle. We know, however, that the probability for capital injections from the owner is considerably higher after the election as compared to the time before the election. Therefore, differences in future bank performance across the electoral cycle can be attributed to the actions of politicians. Performance measures in Panels C to F display a clear pattern across the electoral cycle. In particular, improvements in the capital ratio and reductions in the non-performing loans ratio as well as the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans are considerably smaller for distress events that occurred in the

---

<sup>37</sup>We cannot include distress cases from 2005 or later years as we need at least five years of accounting information for the bank following the distress event.

<sup>38</sup>Specifically, we average the five-year change in the respective variable across banks in the restricted sample for which the distress event occurred at the same time in the electoral cycle.

12 months following an election, when bailouts from the owner are relatively more likely. Similarly, improvements in profitability are smaller for banks that were bailed out in the 12 months following an election. It is important to note that these documented differences in future performance do not depend on the time horizon. We have tried alternative horizons (i.e., four-year changes and six-year changes) and find similar patterns.

Finally, we investigate how future bank performance depends on the type of the bailout in a regression framework. Again, we start with the five-year change in the capital ratio as a dependent variable. Column 1 of Table 7 shows estimates from a simple OLS regression, which confirm that banks receiving capital injections from the owner exhibit lower increases in the capital ratio. As described above, we proceed by using the dummies for the electoral cycle as an instruments in a two-stage least squares regression. The first stage regression is similar to the regressions in Table 3, while restricting the sample to the distress cases without a potential merger partner. Results for the second stage regressions are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 7. Five years after the bailout, the capital ratio increased significantly more for banks that were resolved by the association. Remarkably, the magnitude of the coefficient is considerably larger in the IV regression as compared to the OLS regression: Capital ratios increase by about 1 percent more if the distress case is resolved by the association as compared to the owner. The results are robust to the inclusion of association and time dummies. Again, we observe similar patterns for the other performance measures: Banks receiving capital injections from the owner experienced smaller improvements in the non-performing loans ratio, the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans and the profitability measured by ROA. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic is above the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10 (Stock et al. 2002) in most specifications, which corroborates the relevance of political variables in explaining the occurrence of owner bailouts. Further, the Hansen J-statistic is insignificant in all regressions, so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the political variables we use as instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the second-stage estimation. As the number of observations is very small in these regressions, the findings are particularly impressive. As before, they do not depend on the exact definition of the time horizon (e.g., see Table A.3, where we use four-year changes in the variables instead of five-year changes).

## 5.2. Macroeconomic performance following distress events

In the previous section we showed that savings banks that experience a bailout from the association perform considerably better in the long-run as compared to savings banks that experience a bailout from the owner. By saving the bank from severe restructuring measures that would be imposed by the association, politicians seem to hurt the long run performance of the bank. However, it could be that politicians are not primarily concerned about the health of the bank itself, but rather care about the general economic development within their region. In order to assess this concern we examine the macroeconomic development of the county in which the respective savings bank is located.

In particular, we replicate the estimations from Section 5.1.2, using six county-level indicators (i.e., the share of aggregate financing provided by state banks, the ratio of aggregate loans to GDP, the ratio of aggregate loans to private companies to GDP, the ratio of capital expenditures by firms in the manufacturing sector to GDP, real GDP growth, and the share of employees in the population) as dependent variables. Since we can also track the macroeconomic development of counties whose savings banks got involved in a distressed merger, we only have to worry about omitted variables that affect the owners' bailout decision and the macroeconomic development at the same time (i.e., the second concern in the previous section). To address this concern we use—as before—the electoral cycle as an instrument. The second stage results for five-year changes in the macroeconomic variables are summarized in Table 8. The first four columns indicate that the type of the support measure affects the county-level structure of financing: The share of loans in the county extended by state banks relatively increases in counties where the savings bank was bailed out by the owner. Moreover, the OLS regression in column 5 indicates that counties with bailouts from the owner see a relative increase in financial depth (column 5). However, the difference between the two types of events vanishes in the two-stage least squares regressions (columns 6 to 8). Next, we restrict ourselves to loans to private, non-financial companies and exclude loans to the public sector from the loans to GDP ratio. Columns 9-12 suggest no difference between the different types of support measures: All coefficients are close to zero, and also the OLS coefficient is now insignificant. Overall, it does not seem as if the type of support

measures affects financing conditions for the private sector.

In the remainder of the table, we evaluate the ratio of capital expenditures by firms in the manufacturing sector to GDP, real GDP growth, and the share of employees in the population. There are no significant differences between counties where banks received support from the owner and counties where the distress case was resolved by the association. As in the bank-level tests, the results for the Kleibergen-Paap statistic confirm the validity of our instruments, and the null hypothesis of the Hansen J-test that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the second-stage estimation cannot be rejected in any case. These findings suggest that politicians' decision to use taxpayers' money to bail out a savings bank is not driven by concerns about the general economic development within their region. It is important to note that the fiscal costs of these bailouts are remarkable.

## **6. Conclusion**

In this paper we analyze two distinct bailout regimes within the German savings bank sector: a state-level safety net that resolves distress events conditional on certain restructuring activities, and local politicians who serve as chairmen of the banks and have the possibility to resolve distress events by using taxpayers' money. We find that interventions by local politicians are about 30 % less likely in the year before an election. Furthermore, the long-run performance of banks that were bailed out by politicians is considerably lower as compared with banks that were supported by the association. To rule out the possibility that politicians support their savings bank in order to promote the general economic development within their municipality, we compare different measure of macroeconomic performance between banks obtaining support from the association and politicians. We cannot detect any positive long-run effects in municipalities whose savings banks obtained support from politicians.

Local politicians have local knowledge about the banks in distress. Such knowledge could potentially improve the decision making process, leading to better decisions on bank bailouts. However, we show that decisions by local politicians who are close to the bank



are distorted by personal considerations. Consequently, the outcomes of such bank bailouts are actually worse than for cases that are resolved by the more distant savings bank association. Thus, our paper contributes to the debate about the proximity between banks and politicians / regulators who decide on recapitalizations in the case of distress. It illustrates the advantages of larger distance and broader perspective in bank regulation and supervision. This is particularly important in the light of the current implementation of a European banking union. Our findings suggest that such a regulatory design could have considerable advantages.

## References

- Agarwal, S., Amromin, G., Ben-David, I., and Dinç, I. S. (2012). The legislative process and foreclosures. Working Paper.
- Agarwal, S., Lucca, D. O., Seru, A., and Trebbi, F. (2014). Inconsistent regulators: Evidence from banking. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, forthcoming.
- Baum, C., Schaffer, M., and Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental variables/gmm estimation and testing. *Stata Journal*, 7(4):465–506.
- Beck, T., Coyle, D., Dewatripont, M., Freixas, X., and Seabright, P. (2010). *Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition*. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
- Brown, C. O. and Dinç, I. S. (2005). The politics of bank failures: Evidence from emerging markets. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4):1413–1444.
- Colliard, J.-E. (2013). Monitoring the supervisors: Optimal regulatory architecture in a banking union. Working Paper.
- Dam, L. and Koetter, M. (2012). Bank bailouts, interventions, and moral hazard. *Review of Financial Studies*, 25(8):2343–2380.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (2002). Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? an empirical investigation. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 49(7):1373–1406.
- Die Welt (2012). *Die Sparkassenwelt ist die der gegenseitigen Vorteile*. Axel Springer Verlag, Berlin. Online: <http://www.welt.de> [02.01.2013].
- Dinç, I. S. (2005). Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 77(2):453–479.
- Duchin, R. and Sosyura, D. (2012). The politics of government investment. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 106(1):24–48.

- Englmaier, F. and Stowasser, T. (2012). Electoral cycles in savings bank lending. Working Paper, University of Würzburg.
- Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., and McConnell, J. J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. *Journal of Finance*, 61(6):2597–2635.
- Gropp, R., Hakenes, H., and Schnabel, I. (2011). Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies. *Review of Financial Studies*, 24(6):2084–2120.
- Halling, M., Pichler, P., and Stomper, A. (2014). The politics of related lending. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, forthcoming.
- Imai, M. (2009). Political influence and declarations of bank insolvency in Japan. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 41(1):131–158.
- Keeley, M. C. (1990). Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. *American Economic Review*, 80(5):1183–1200.
- Kroszner, R. S. and Strahan, P. E. (1999). What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4):1437–1467.
- Liu, W.-M. and Ngo, P. (2014). Elections, political competition and bank failure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 112(2):251–268.
- McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H. (2010). Political fortunes: on finance & its regulation. *Daedalus – Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences*, Fall 2010:61–73.
- Merton, R. C. (1977). An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 1(1):3–11.
- Mian, A., Sufi, A., and Trebbi, F. (2010). The political economy of the US mortgage default crisis. *American Economic Review*, 100(5):1967–1998.
- Mian, A., Sufi, A., and Trebbi, F. (2012). The political economy of the subprime mortgage credit expansion. Working Paper.

- Nunez, S. and Rosenthal, H. (2004). Bankruptcy reform in congress: Creditors, committees, ideology, and floor voting in the legislative process. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 20(2):527–557.
- Pana, E. and Wilson, L. (2012). Political influence and TARP investments in credit unions. *The Quarterly Journal of Finance*, 2(04).
- Peltzman, S. (1985). An economic interpretation of the history of congressional voting in the twentieth century. *American Economic Review*, 75(4):656–675.
- Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1996). Are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents? *European Economic Review*, 40(3-5):707717.
- Puente, L. (2012). Political influence and TARP: An analysis of treasury's disposition of cpp warrants. *Political Science & Politics*, 45(02):211–217.
- Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband (2009). *Satzung des Rheinischen Sparkassen- und Giroverbandes*. Düsseldorf. Online: <http://www.rsgv.de> [02.01.2013].
- Rogoff, K. and Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. *Review of Economic Studies*, 55:1–66.
- Romer, T. and Weingast, B. R. (1991). Political foundations of the thrift debacle. In Alesina, A. and Carliner, G., editors, *Politics and Economics in the Eighties*. University of Chicago Press.
- Sapienza, P. (2004). The effects of government ownership on bank lending. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 72(2):357–384.
- Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (2004). *Mustersatzung für die Sparkassenstützungsfonds der Regionalverbände*. Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, Berlin. Online: <http://www.sparkasse.de> [02.01.2013].
- Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (2010). *Geschäftsbericht 2010*. Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, Berlin. Online: <http://www.dsgv.de> [02.01.2013].

Stock, J. H., Wright, J. H., and Yogo, M. (2002). A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in generalized method of moments. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 20(4).

Vins, O. (2008). How politics influence state-owned banks - The case of German savings banks. Working Paper, University of Frankfurt.





Figure 1: Institutional Setup

Figure 1 illustrates the institutional setup for our analysis. The main institutions are the savings bank associations that operate the savings bank guarantee funds, the local counties or cities that own and back the individual banks, and of course the banks themselves. The figure shows that there are several personal and institutional connections within this system.



Figure 2: Distribution of distress events over time

The figure shows the number of distress events over the sample period. It distinguishes between cases that are resolved by the association and cases that are resolved by the owner (i.e., local politicians).



Total distress events

Figure 3: Distress events and the Electoral Cycle.

Figure 3 illustrates how the number of distress events varies over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.






Figure 4: Capital Injections from the Owner and Electoral Cycle.

Figure 4 illustrates how the number of banks that receive capital injections from the owner varies over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.







Panel A: CI Owner




Panel B: CI Owner (relative frequency)




Panel C: Capital ratio



Panel D: NPL ratio



Panel E: LLP to CL ratio



Panel F: ROA

### Figure 5: Long Run Performance and Electoral Cycle

Figure 5 illustrates how the long run performance of banks in distress depends on the timing of the distress event over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date. We restrict the sample to banks without a potential partner for a distressed merger to account for selection bias. Panel A shows the number of capital injections from the owner across the electoral cycle in the restricted sample, whereas Panel B shows the relative frequency. Further, we calculate the five-year change in the capital ratio (Panel C), the non-performing loans ratio (Panel D), the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans (Panel E), and the ROA (Panel F), and then show the average of this change across banks that experienced a distress event at the same time during the electoral cycle.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Events		Obs.	All banks		Support from owner		Support from association			
			Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean	S.D.
Support from owner		55								
Support from association		93								
... capital support		49								
... distressed merger		44								
Total		148								
Panel B: Bank variables		Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	S.D.
Total assets (€ mn)		8,246	1,780	2,530	636	2,770	4,150	706	1,660	1,810
Log(Total assets)		8,246	20.81	0.95	636	21.15	1.02	706	20.74	1.01
Total assets / GDP (in %)		8,228	37.24	31.90	636	53.50	51.88	706	39.47	41.57
Market share (in %)		8,219	22.50	16.39	636	23.83	15.55	706	16.88	16.33
Capital ratio (in %)		8,246	4.55	1.04	636	4.30	0.88	706	3.99	0.94
ROA (in %)		8,239	0.75	0.50	635	0.57	0.52	706	0.54	0.69
NPL ratio (in %)		8,195	3.79	2.61	634	4.06	2.79	703	5.26	3.42
Deposit ratio (in %)		8,245	67.47	9.49	635	61.14	10.60	706	65.47	11.19
Loans to owner / GDP (in %)		8,229	1.03	1.41	636	1.08	1.85	706	0.90	1.16
<i>Conditional on distress</i>										
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board		148	0.20	0.40						

Table 1 continued...

Panel C: Macro & Other variables		All banks		Support from owner		Support from association			
	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	S.D.
GDPPC growth (in %)	8,246	1.288	3.816	636	1.040	3.925	706	1.874	4.034
GDPPC (in €)	8,228	23,771	8,528	636	27,280	7,931	706	22,648	6,542
Log(GDPPC)	8,228	10.024	0.313	636	10.173	0.285	706	9.988	0.281
Government debt / GDP (in %)	8,246	4.623	1.983	636	3.931	2.028	706	4.862	2.241
Panel D: Political variables		Obs.	Support from owner	Support from association					
All	148	0.372	0.628						
12-24 months before election	31	0.355	0.645						
0-12 months before election	26	0.154	0.846						
0-12 months after election	30	0.500	0.500						
12-24 months after election	34	0.441	0.559						
24-36 months after election	27	0.370	0.630						
No competitive county	73	0.438	0.562						
Competitive county	75	0.307	0.693						
No conservative chairman	88	0.455	0.545						
Conservative chairman	60	0.250	0.750						

The table shows descriptive statistics for the banks in our sample. In Panel A we report the number of distress events, where we distinguish between support measures from the owner and support measures from the association. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for key bank variables. The unit of observation is a bank-year. The first three columns show statistics for all banks in our sample, whereas the other columns include only bank-year observation of banks that experienced support measures from the owner or the association during our sample period. Panel C provides descriptive statistics for macro control variables and a dummy variable that we use in the empirical analysis. Finally, Panel D shows the distribution of capital injections from the owner and support measures by the association, and how this distribution depends on political variables. For example, of the 148 distress events in our sample, 37.2 % were capital injections from the owner, while 62.8 % were support measures from the association. Depending on the values of the political variables this distribution differs.

Table 2: Hazard Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
D(0-12 months after)	0.376 (0.411)	0.656 (0.465)	0.346 (0.596)	0.016 (0.689)
D(12-24 months after)	-0.579 (0.441)	-0.339 (0.451)	-0.017 (0.622)	-0.236 (0.739)
D(24-36 months after)	-0.297 (0.441)	-0.339 (0.552)	-0.302 (0.618)	-0.369 (0.816)
D(12-24 months before)	0.484 (0.438)	0.561 (0.516)	0.433 (0.556)	0.407 (0.594)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1)		0.308 (0.312)	-0.000 (0.205)	0.099 (0.211)
Capital Ratio (t-1)		-0.047 (0.189)	-0.107 (0.172)	-0.298** (0.141)
ROA (t-1)		-0.237 (0.182)	-0.243 (0.172)	-0.234 (0.210)
NPL Ratio (t-1)		-0.001 (0.001)	-0.013 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.000)
Market Share (t-1)		-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.025** (0.012)
Deposit Ratio (t-1)		-0.025 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.022 (0.021)
GDPPC Growth (t-1)		0.007 (0.040)	-0.000 (0.043)	-0.010 (0.051)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1)		-0.088 (0.565)	-0.447 (0.492)	-0.613*** (0.201)
Time dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES
Association dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182

The table shows results for the following exponential hazard model:

$$h_i(t) = \exp(\beta'_0 \cdot x_{it-1} + \beta'_1 \cdot \text{Electoral Cycle}_{it} + \beta'_2 \cdot \text{time}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{association}_i),$$

where  $x_{it-1}$  denotes the a vector of covariates for bank  $i$  at time or duration  $t$ ;  $\beta$  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The vector *Election Cycle*<sub>it</sub> indicates our dummies for the electoral cycle. Regressions include all bank-year observations for savings banks that experienced a distress event during our sample period. Time dummies indicate the four election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), while association dummies indicate the regional savings bank association of the bank. Standard errors are clustered by year. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the yearly level are denoted in parentheses. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

Table 3: Event Type

	Dependent Variable: Event Type				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1)	-0.138** (0.056)	-0.177*** (0.048)	-0.116* (0.060)	-0.160** (0.055)	-0.157** (0.059)
Capital Ratio (t-1)	-0.034 (0.037)	-0.042 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.065 (0.052)
ROA (t-1)	0.067 (0.071)	0.071 (0.058)	0.039 (0.079)	0.046 (0.063)	-0.017 (0.055)
NPL Ratio (t-1)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.021 (0.012)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.019* (0.010)
Market Share (t-1)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)
Deposit Ratio (t-1)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)
GDPPC Growth (t-1)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.021** (0.009)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1)	0.030 (0.095)	0.040 (0.113)	-0.049 (0.092)	-0.051 (0.114)	0.016 (0.110)
D(0-12 months after)		0.286*** (0.082)		0.301*** (0.080)	0.265** (0.102)
D(12-24 months after)		0.390*** (0.092)		0.384*** (0.088)	0.413*** (0.098)
D(24-36 months after)		0.230** (0.090)		0.222** (0.100)	0.233** (0.088)
D(12-24 months before)		0.296** (0.137)		0.310** (0.129)	0.275* (0.139)
Competitive County			-0.150** (0.068)	-0.118 (0.070)	-0.166** (0.077)
Cons. Bank Chairman			-0.181** (0.080)	-0.200** (0.086)	-0.141 (0.081)
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Association Dummies	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	148	148	148	148	148
R-squared	0.240	0.305	0.277	0.341	0.490

The table shows results for an OLS estimation of the following equation:

$$Event\ Type_{ijkt} = association_j + time_t + POL'_{kt}\beta + B'_{it-1}\gamma + C'_{kt-1}\delta + \varepsilon_{ijkt},$$

where  $i$  denotes the individual bank,  $j$  the association,  $k$  the county or city where the bank is located, and  $t$  the year of the event. The dummy  $Event\ Type_{ijkt}$  equals one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from the association. The vector of political variables is denoted by  $POL_{kt}$ ,  $B_{it-1}$  includes bank-level control variables, and  $C_{kt-1}$  is the vector of regional control variables. All columns include time dummies for the four election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and column 5 additionally includes a set of dummy variables that indicate the association of the bank. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the yearly level are denoted in parentheses. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

Table 4: Fiscal Variables and Alternative Stories

	Dependent Variable: Event Type									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Capital Ratio (t-1)	-0.034 (0.037)	-0.088 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.039)	-0.087 (0.055)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.088 (0.057)	-0.034 (0.039)	-0.089 (0.058)	-0.045 (0.048)	-0.068 (0.055)
ROA (t-1)	0.067 (0.071)	0.030 (0.059)	0.073 (0.075)	0.036 (0.063)	0.065 (0.071)	0.034 (0.058)	0.069 (0.071)	0.033 (0.059)	0.054 (0.068)	0.002 (0.060)
NPL Ratio (t-1)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.017 (0.010)	-0.019 (0.011)	-0.016* (0.009)
Market Share (t-1)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
Deposit Ratio (t-1)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)
GDPPC Growth (t-1)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.022* (0.010)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1)	0.030 (0.095)	-0.052 (0.119)	-0.090 (0.114)	-0.076 (0.127)	0.068 (0.119)	-0.079 (0.155)	0.027 (0.096)	-0.046 (0.128)	-0.110 (0.159)	-0.064 (0.156)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1)	-0.138** (0.056)	-0.139*** (0.042)	-0.132** (0.055)	-0.142*** (0.045)	-0.144** (0.057)	-0.132** (0.048)	-0.109 (0.102)	-0.107 (0.093)	-0.164 (0.107)	-0.121 (0.111)
Government Debt / GDP (t-1)			-0.044** (0.015)	-0.037** (0.016)					-0.025 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.020)
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board						0.047 (0.124)			0.012 (0.119)	0.124 (0.108)
Loans to Owner / GDP (t-1)							-0.015 (0.042)		0.003 (0.037)	-0.011 (0.035)
D(0-12 months after)									0.302*** (0.082)	0.269** (0.109)
D(12-24 months after)									0.363*** (0.110)	0.429*** (0.103)
D(24-36 months after)									0.224** (0.098)	0.247** (0.088)
D(12-24 months before)									0.313** (0.124)	0.298** (0.133)
Competitive County									-0.099 (0.070)	-0.157 (0.092)
Cons. Bank Chairman									-0.172* (0.087)	-0.138 (0.090)
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Association Dummies	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	148	148	148	148	148	148	148	148	148	148
R-squared	0.240	0.407	0.268	0.420	0.244	0.408	0.241	0.408	0.349	0.503

The table shows how fiscal and other variables affect the likelihood of a bailout from the owner. As before the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from the association. Bank control variables are the same as in Table 3. Additionally, we include the county-level ratio of government indebtedness to GDP (*Government Debt / GDP*), a dummy variable *Bank Chairman in Ass. Board* that takes the value of one if the chairman of the bank in distress is a member of the local savings bank association, and the variable *Loans to Owner / GDP* that gives the amount of credit extended by the savings bank to the local government divided by local GDP. As before, all variables are lagged by one period. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 include time dummies for the four election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 include additional dummies that indicate the association of the bank. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the yearly level are denoted in parentheses. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

Table 5: Change in Key Variables

Percentage Change in...	Customer Loans				Employees				Personnel Expenditures				Number of Branches											
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)		(12)	
	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference	Association	Owner	Difference
Pre Bailout	Mean	0,063	0,058	0,004	-0,007	-0,001	-0,006	0,038	0,033	0,006	0,038	0,033	0,006	-0,013	-0,027	0,014								
	Median	0,057	0,059		-0,006	-0,003		0,037	0,029		0,037	0,029		0,000	0,000									
	S.D.	0,078	0,069		0,055	0,044		0,105	0,071		0,105	0,071		0,074	0,091									
	Obs.	169	266		169	266		169	266		169	266		151	244									
5 Years Before	Mean	0,043	0,046	-0,004	-0,008	0,001	-0,009	0,025	0,027	-0,002	0,025	0,027	-0,002	-0,016	-0,039	0,023*								
	Median	0,047	0,051		-0,011	0,000		0,027	0,023		0,027	0,023		0,000	0,000									
	S.D.	0,061	0,056		0,048	0,050		0,094	0,053		0,094	0,053		0,090	0,107									
	Obs.	125	181		125	181		123	181		123	181		104	149									
Bailout Year	Mean	0,000***	0,028***	-0,028**	-0,009	0,004	-0,013	0,020	0,028	-0,008	0,020	0,028	-0,008	-0,081***	-0,102***	0,021								
	Median	-0,010	0,020		-0,014	-0,005		0,018	0,036		0,018	0,036		0,000	-0,010									
	S.D.	0,062	0,057		0,071	0,062		0,084	0,065		0,084	0,065		0,152	0,187									
	Obs.	41	54		41	54		39	54		39	54		32	32									

Table 5 continued...

Percentage Change in...	Customer Loans			Employees			Personnel Expenditures			Number of Branches		
	(1) Association	(2) Owner	(3) Difference	(4) Association	(5) Owner	(6) Difference	(7) Association	(8) Owner	(9) Difference	(10) Association	(11) Owner	(12) Difference
Bailout Year + 1												
Mean	-0,016***	0,016***	-0,032***	-0,028**	-0,004	-0,023*	0,004*	0,004**	-0,001	-0,087***	-0,039	-0,048
Median	-0,030	0,016		-0,017	-0,014		0,010	0,016		0,000	0,000	
S.D.	0,066	0,041		0,050	0,063		0,087	0,073		0,188	0,074	
Obs.	41	45		40	45		40	45		31	26	
Bailout Year + 2												
Mean	-0,018***	0,024***	-0,042***	-0,030**	-0,014*	-0,016*	0,008	0,019	-0,011	-0,141***	-0,128***	-0,013
Median	-0,016	0,028		-0,027	-0,011		-0,003	0,019		-0,004	-0,033	
S.D.	0,052	0,039		0,033	0,040		0,085	0,066		0,281	0,204	
Obs.	33	38		33	38		33	38		24	23	
Bailout Year + 3												
Mean	-0,014***	0,025***	-0,039***	-0,038***	-0,011	-0,027*	0,013	0,006**	0,007	-0,110***	-0,029	-0,082
Median	-0,007	0,022		-0,029	-0,021		0,008	0,015		-0,018	0,000	
S.D.	0,044	0,050		0,042	0,064		0,056	0,068		0,228	0,116	
Obs.	31	36		30	36		31	36		18	19	

The table shows changes in key variables of savings banks around the years of capital injections. The first set of rows shows pre-event statistics of banks that experienced a distress event during our sample period. All bank-year observations prior to the event denoted on top of the column are included. The second set of rows restricts the sample to the five years prior to the respective event. The other rows show the statistics for the event year as well as the years following the event. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level, in a two-sided test of the mean of bank-year observations prior to the event and bank-year observations in the respective year around the event (columns 1-2, 4-5, 7-8, and 10-11). In columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level, in a two-sided test of the mean of bank-year observations of banks that received capital injections from the association and bank-year observations of banks that received capital injections from the owner in the respective year around the event.



Table 6: Long-Run Performance—Descriptives

	Association			Owner			Difference (2)-(5)
	(1) Obs.	(2) Mean	(3) S.D.	(4) Obs.	(5) Mean	(6) S.D.	
<b>Capital Ratio</b>							
t=4	35	0.590	0.615	39	0.254	0.413	0.336***
t=5	29	0.578	0.647	34	0.229	0.452	0.349**
t=6	24	0.499	0.647	27	0.277	0.500	0.222
t=7	22	0.618	0.563	22	0.303	0.478	0.315*
<b>NPL Ratio</b>							
t=4	34	-3.238	4.209	38	0.106	3.077	-3.344***
t=5	29	-4.011	4.136	34	-0.001	3.569	-4.010***
t=6	24	-4.907	4.285	27	-0.795	3.826	-4.111***
t=7	22	-5.118	4.515	22	-1.140	3.577	-3.977***
<b>LLP to CL</b>							
t=4	34	-0.698	0.759	39	-0.287	0.837	-0.411**
t=5	29	-0.759	0.767	34	-0.343	0.824	-0.415**
t=6	24	-0.750	0.793	27	-0.384	0.908	-0.365
t=7	22	-0.813	0.823	22	-0.493	0.860	-0.320
<b>ROA</b>							
t=4	34	0.271	0.649	39	0.050	0.508	0.221
t=5	29	0.290	0.594	34	0.062	0.464	0.228*
t=6	24	0.213	0.537	27	0.015	0.566	0.198
t=7	22	0.309	0.526	22	0.069	0.482	0.240

The table shows changes in key variables for banks that experienced a distress event. With  $t$  denoting the number of years since the bailout event, we calculate for each bank and for  $t \in \{4, 5, 6, 7\}$

$$\frac{1}{t+1-4} \sum_{i=4}^t var_i - var_0,$$

where  $var_i$  denotes the value of the variable in the  $i$ th year after the bailout and  $var_0$  denotes the value in the bailout year. We then average these changes across banks. Column 7 shows the difference in the mean between the two groups of banks, where \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical differences in the mean at the 10 %-level, 5 %-level, and 1 %-level, respectively.

Table 7: Long-Run Performance—Regressions

	Capital Ratio				NPL Ratio			
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) IV	(8) IV
Owner	-0.389** (0.151)	-0.833** (0.335)	-1.122*** (0.383)	-1.145*** (0.377)	5.002*** (0.927)	3.425* (1.960)	8.942*** (2.279)	8.540*** (2.161)
Constant	0.578*** (0.105)	0.792*** (0.180)			-4.011*** (0.644)	-3.250*** (1.054)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
R-squared	0.110	0.114	0.132	0.144	0.350	0.316	0.406	0.455
Kleibergen-Paap statistic	—	7.899	31.85	26.75	—	7.899	31.85	26.75
Hansen J-statistic	—	5.217	3.959	5.009	—	8.465	7.955	8.091
Hansen (p-value)	—	0.390	0.555	0.415	—	0.132	0.159	0.151
			LLP to CL					
	(9) OLS	(10) IV	(11) IV	(12) IV	(13) OLS	(14) IV	(15) IV	(16) IV
Owner	0.629*** (0.184)	0.910** (0.388)	0.485 (0.424)	0.459 (0.401)	-0.289* (0.145)	-0.522* (0.306)	-0.292 (0.352)	-0.283 (0.343)
Constant	-0.759*** (0.128)	-0.894*** (0.208)			0.290*** (0.101)	0.402** (0.164)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
R-squared	0.178	0.142	0.341	0.399	0.069	0.024	0.168	0.194
Kleibergen-Paap statistic	—	7.899	31.85	26.75	—	7.899	31.85	26.75
Hansen J-statistic	—	6.022	7.809	7.624	—	7.650	7.734	6.981
Hansen (p-value)	—	0.304	0.167	0.178	—	0.177	0.171	0.222

The table examines how banks' long-run performance following a distress event depends on the type of the distress event. We restrict the sample to banks without a potential partner for a distressed merger to account for selection bias. The dependent variable is the five-year change in the capital ratio as compared to the bailout year in columns 1-4, the five-year change in the non-performing loans ratio in column 5-8, the five-year change in the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans in columns 9-12, and the five-year change in ROA in columns 13-16. Columns 1, 5, 9, and 13 report results for simple OLS regressions, where *Owner* is a dummy equal to one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and equal to zero if it received support from the association. The remaining columns show results for two-stage least squares regressions. In the first stage, we regress the dummy variable *Owner* on the political variables from above (dummies for the electoral cycle, competitive counties, and conservative bank chairmen), and the additional dummy variables specified at the bottom of the table. In the second change, predicted probabilities from the first stage are used to predict the five-year change in the respective variable. Again, we include the additional dummy variables denoted at the bottom of the table. The Kleibergen-Paap is a test statistic for weak identification pertaining to the excluded covariates in the respective columns (Baum et al. 2007). The Hansen J is a test statistic for overidentification (Baum et al. 2007). \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

Table 8: Macroeconomic Developments—Regressions

	State Bank Loan Share				Loans to GDP			
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) IV	(8) IV
Owner	0.0630*** (0.0208)	0.0902** (0.0456)	0.2436*** (0.0754)	0.2156*** (0.0753)	0.2462** (0.1224)	0.2660 (0.2845)	0.6606 (0.4262)	0.5703 (0.4388)
Constant	-0.0337** (0.0131)	-0.0444** (0.0207)			-0.0791 (0.0750)	-0.0865 (0.1217)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	104	104	104	104	88	88	88	88
R-squared	0.0824	0.0672	0.2345	0.3734	0.0449	0.0446	0.0362	0.1921
Kleibergen-Paap statistic	—	59.75	21.60	7.687	—	54.94	20.93	4.951
Hansen J-statistic	—	3.500	4.249	2.149	—	3.382	3.422	5.727
Hansen (p-value)	—	0.623	0.514	0.828	—	0.641	0.635	0.334
	Loans to Private Corporate Sector to GDP				Private Capital Expenditures to GDP			
	(9) OLS	(10) IV	(11) IV	(12) IV	(13) OLS	(14) IV	(15) IV	(16) IV
Owner	0.0241 (0.0165)	0.0310 (0.0404)	0.0247 (0.0376)	0.0464 (0.0466)	0.0003 (0.0054)	0.0129 (0.0129)	0.0161 (0.0180)	0.0150 (0.0200)
Constant	-0.0068 (0.0101)	-0.0093 (0.0170)			0.0009 (0.0033)	-0.0039 (0.0055)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	83	83	83	83	88	88	88	88
R-squared	0.0256	0.0236	0.1975	0.4191	0.0000	0.0112	0.0636	0.0910
Kleibergen-Paap statistic	—	25.35	25.67	4.850	—	54.94	20.93	4.951
Hansen J-statistic	—	6.652	5.103	5.244	—	5.897	6.604	5.862
Hansen (p-value)	—	0.248	0.403	0.387	—	0.316	0.252	0.320
	Real GDP Growth				Share of Employees in Population			
	(17) OLS	(18) IV	(19) IV	(20) IV	(21) OLS	(22) IV	(23) IV	(24) IV
Owner	0.0036 (0.0162)	-0.0215 (0.0383)	-0.0205 (0.0528)	-0.0445 (0.0605)	0.0041 (0.0045)	-0.0037 (0.0108)	-0.0173 (0.0154)	-0.0360* (0.0194)
Constant	0.0770*** (0.0100)	0.0864*** (0.0164)			0.0098*** (0.0028)	0.0127*** (0.0046)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	88	88	88	88	91	91	91	91
R-squared	0.0006	0.0037	0.1692	0.2103	0.0093	0.0013	0.1504	0.2797
Kleibergen-Paap statistic	—	54.94	20.93	4.951	—	51.85	41.32	7.216
Hansen J-statistic	—	4.527	9.181	7.295	—	7.900	4.630	9.335
Hansen (p-value)	—	0.476	0.102	0.200	—	0.162	0.463	0.0964

The table examines how macroeconomic developments on the county level following a distress event depend on the type of the distress event. The sample includes all observations for which we are able to obtain the dependent variable, which is the five-year change in share of loans in the county that is extended by state banks in columns 1-4, the five-year change in the ratio of aggregate loans to GDP as compared to the bailout year in column 5-8, the five-year change in the ratio of aggregate loans to the private corporate sector to GDP as compared to the bailout year in column 9-12, the five-year change in the ratio of capital expenditures in the manufacturing sector to GDP as compared to the bailout year in column 13-16, the five-year real GDP growth rate in columns 17-20, and the five-year change in the share of employees in the population in columns 21-24. As in Table 7, columns 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 report results for simple OLS regressions, whereas the remaining columns show results for two-stage least squares regressions. Again, we include the additional dummy variables denoted at the bottom of the table. The Kleibergen-Paap is a test statistic for weak identification pertaining to the excluded covariates in the respective columns (Baum et al. 2007). The Hansen J is a test statistic for overidentification (Baum et al. 2007). \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

## **Appendix**

## Description of Bundesbank data sources

**The Bundesbank’s prudential data base (BAKIS):** This database (for which the German Banking Act forms the legal basis) contains micro data on German banks which is available from the 1990s on and used for both supervisory monitoring of financial institutions and research purposes. These data contain sensitive and confidential supervisory information and, therefore, can only be used at the Bundesbank premises and the results may be published only after a thorough anonymization of the data.<sup>39</sup> From the BAKIS data base we obtain bank balance sheet data to construct control variables for our regression analyses. More importantly, we also get access to the “Sonderdatenkatalog 1” which is a special dataset containing confidential information which banks are legally bound to report to Bundesbank and BaFin and, amongst others, allow us to identify capital support measures savings banks received from the association.

**The monthly balance sheet statistics (BISTA):** This data base gives a comprehensive overview on German financial institutions’ business activities. Hereby, banks are legally bound to report their balance sheet data on a monthly and highly disaggregated basis. For our project a major challenge was to access historical BISTA data which allows us to identify the size of the capital injection as well as the particular month this event occurred. Moreover, the BISTA database also provides us with information on each bank’s lending to municipalities (which is used to identify further motives behind bank bailouts).

**The quarterly borrowers’ statistics:** This database contains domestic loan portfolio exposures and write-off data on the bank-portfolio level (i.e., lending to the German real sector can be identified for 24 corporate and 3 retail portfolios per bank). Loan exposure data is available from the early 1990s on while data on write-offs can be accessed from 2002-2010. In our empirical study data from the borrowers’ statistics is used to double-check the information on the timing of bailout events, in particular by the banking association, for roughly half of the time-period of our dataset. For the period before 2002 we have to rely

---

<sup>39</sup>For a detailed description of the BAKIS data base see, for example, Memmel, C. and I. Stein (2008), “The Deutsche Bundesbank’s Prudential Database (BAKIS)”, in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 128, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pages 321-328.

on the evolution of the capital adequacy ratio in order to identify the timing of the distress event within a year.

**The Bundesbank's distress data base:** This database contains information on distress events which occurred at German financial institutions from the early 1990s on. For our analyses we rely on information on so-called “distressed mergers”; that is, we need to distinguish distressed (or restructuring) mergers from pure “economy of scale mergers”. As the distress database is only available until 2006, we define a distressed merger in the years 2007-2010 as a passive merger where the bank that was taken over experienced a severe distress event (i.e., a moratorium, a capital support measure, or a very low capital ratio) in the three year before the merger.




Figure A.1: CI from owner and electoral cycle (in % of all distress events).

Figure A.1 illustrates how the number of banks that receive capital injections from the owner varies over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.

Table A.1: Variable Definitions

<b>Panel A: Events</b>	
Support from owner	Capital injections from the bank owner are identified by an increase in a bank's subscribed capital that cannot be explained by takeovers or restructuring of equity positions (so called "stille Einlage"). Note that for historical reasons, the equity capital of savings banks usually consists solely of contingency funds (so called "Sicherheitsrücklage"). These funds were originally provided by the owner of the bank in the year of foundation and then cumulated over the years out of the bank's retained earnings. However, if the savings bank—besides its equity in the contingency funds—also has subscribed capital unequal to zero, then this usually indicates an undisclosed participation of the bank owner.
Support from association	Capital injections or guarantees from the association, obtained from "Sonderdatenkatolog 1" of the Bundesbank BAKIS database
... capital support	Information on distressed mergers is taken from the Bundesbank distress data base. As this database is only available until 2006, we define a distressed merger in the years 2007-2010 as a passive merger where the bank that was taken over experienced a severe distress event in the three years before the merger (i.e., a moratorium, a capital support measure, or a very low capital ratio).
... distressed merger	
<b>Panel B: Bank Variables</b>	
<i>Control Variables</i>	
Total Bank Assets	Total assets (in Mio. EUR)
Log Bank Assets	Logarithm (ln) of total assets
Total Assets / GDP	Total assets to GDP ratio (county level, in %)
Capital Ratio	Equity capital to total assets ratio (in %)
ROA	Return (operative result) on total assets (in %)
NPL Ratio	Non-performing loans to customer loans ratio (in %)
Market Share (in %)	Share of bank branches in the respective county where very small branches (e.g., branches from the Deutsche Postbank) are excluded. Note that until 2004 banks are legally bound to report the exact location of each of their branches to the Deutsche Bundesbank; from 2005 on the share of branches can be proxied from banks' voluntary reporting and from cross-sectional information.
Deposit Ratio	Savings deposits, term deposits, and time deposits to total assets ratio (in %)
Loans to Owner / GDP	Claims against municipal governments to GDP ratio (county level, in %)
<i>Conditional on Distress</i>	
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board	Dummy = 1 if the chairman of the bank in distress is also a member of the board of the association.
<i>Restructuring Variables</i>	
Growth Rate (Employees)	Year-on-year change of number of bank employees (growth rate)
Growth Rate (Number of Branches)	Year-on-year change of number of bank branches (growth rate, available until 2004)
Growth Rate (Customer Loans)	Year-on-year change of customer loans to total assets ratio (growth rate)
Growth Rate (Pers. Expenditures)	Year-on-year change of personnel expenditures (growth rate)
Loan Loss Provisions / Customer Loans	Loan loss provisions to customer loans (in %)



Table A.1 continued...

Panel C: Macro & Other Variables	
GDPPC Growth	Year-on-year change of real GDP per capita (county level, in %)
Log(GDPPC)	Logarithm (ln) of real GDP per capita (county level)
Government Debt / GDP	Municipal government debt to GDP (county level, in %)
<i>Restructuring Variables</i>	
State Bank Loan Share	Share of loans in the German credit register that is granted by state banks in a given year
Loans to GDP	Loans in the German credit register aggregated at the county level and divided by county-level GDP
Loans to Private Corporate Sector to GDP	Loans in the German credit register to private companies aggregated at the county level and divided by county-level GDP
Private Capital Expenditures to GDP	Capital expenditures by companies in the manufacturing sector aggregated at the county level and divided by county-level GDP
Real GDP Growth	Year-on-year change in real GDP (county level, in %)
Share of Employees in Population	Ratio of employees to total inhabitants (county level)
Panel D: Political Variables	
D(12-24 months before)	Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 12-24 months before the distress event.
D(0-12 months before)	Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections will take place 0 to 12 months before the distress event.
D(0-12 months after)	Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 0 to 12 months after the distress event.
D(12-24 months after)	Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 12-24 months after the distress event.
D(24-36 months after)	Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 24-36 months after the distress event.
No Competitive County	Dummy = 0 for a non-competitive county.
Competitive County	Dummy = 1 for competitive counties. Hereby, the vote share margin between the first and the second party within the county from the respective state election is calculated. Then the dummy is defined as equal to one if the vote share margin is smaller than the median and zero otherwise.
No Conservative Bank Chairman	This taken as a proxy for political competition within the county/city: The smaller the vote share margin between the first and the second party, the more intense the political competition and the more effective the disciplining role voters can exert on politicians.
Conservative Bank Chairman	Dummy = 0 for a non-conservative chairman. Dummy = 1 if the chairman of the savings bank's supervisory board is a member of a conservative party (i.e., "CDU" or "CSU").

The table shows a description of the variables we use in the empirical analysis.

Table A.2: Event Type—Logit Models

	Dependent Variable: Event Type				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1)	-0.755** (0.299)	-1.093*** (0.262)	-0.707** (0.337)	-1.058*** (0.309)	-1.243** (0.595)
Capital Ratio (t-1)	-0.248 (0.182)	-0.334 (0.251)	-0.190 (0.184)	-0.326 (0.278)	-0.705 (0.524)
ROA (t-1)	0.353 (0.420)	0.458 (0.357)	0.237 (0.458)	0.411 (0.407)	-0.215 (0.669)
NPL Ratio (t-1)	-0.149* (0.078)	-0.154* (0.093)	-0.154* (0.080)	-0.154* (0.089)	-0.237** (0.116)
Market Share (t-1)	0.051*** (0.016)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.051*** (0.018)	0.060*** (0.018)	0.067* (0.035)
Deposit Ratio (t-1)	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.044* (0.025)	-0.028 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.027)	0.001 (0.038)
GDPPC Growth (t-1)	-0.109* (0.060)	-0.130* (0.068)	-0.111* (0.060)	-0.135* (0.069)	-0.139* (0.079)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1)	0.179 (0.552)	0.186 (0.676)	-0.217 (0.584)	-0.290 (0.749)	0.272 (0.865)
D(0-12 months after)		2.191*** (0.701)		2.381*** (0.768)	2.614* (1.381)
D(12-24 months after)		2.753*** (0.696)		2.818*** (0.743)	3.571** (1.461)
D(24-36 months after)		1.976** (0.781)		2.015** (0.978)	2.804* (1.526)
D(12-24 months before)		2.361** (1.105)		2.583** (1.245)	3.551 (2.273)
Competitive County			-0.846** (0.401)	-0.752* (0.430)	-1.887** (0.752)
Cons. Bank Chairman			-0.950*** (0.360)	-1.140*** (0.440)	-1.132** (0.465)
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Association Dummies	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	148	148	148	148	148
Pseudo R-Squared	0.209	0.283	0.244	0.318	0.492

The table re-estimates the results from Table 3, using a nonlinear logit specification instead of the OLS specification. As before, the dependent variable  $Event\ Type_{ijkl}$  equals one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from the association. All columns include time dummies for the four election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and column 5 additionally includes a set of dummy variables that indicate the association of the bank. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.

Table A.3: Long-Run Performance—Alternative Horizon

	Capital Ratio				NPL Ratio			
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) IV	(8) IV
Owner	-0.367*** (0.133)	-0.621** (0.266)	-0.886*** (0.299)	-0.965*** (0.301)	4.155*** (0.857)	2.935* (1.767)	8.368*** (2.193)	7.530*** (2.141)
Constant	0.590*** (0.091)	0.709*** (0.142)			-3.238*** (0.586)	-2.667*** (0.932)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	66	66	66	66	64	64	64	64
R-squared	0.107	0.055	0.208	0.267	0.275	0.251	0.300	0.357

	LLP to CL				ROA			
	(9) OLS	(10) IV	(11) IV	(12) IV	(13) OLS	(14) IV	(15) IV	(16) IV
Owner	0.621*** (0.170)	0.903*** (0.343)	0.593 (0.404)	0.448 (0.403)	-0.299** (0.146)	-0.489* (0.292)	-0.540 (0.364)	-0.428 (0.368)
Constant	-0.698*** (0.117)	-0.832*** (0.184)			0.271*** (0.101)	0.362** (0.157)		
Association Dummies	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Time Dummies	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.175	0.139	0.265	0.321	0.063	0.037	0.084	0.127

The table shows robustness checks for the estimations presented in Table 7. In particular, we use four-year changes in the respective variables instead of five-year changes. As before, we restrict the sample to banks without a potential partner for a distressed merger to account for selection bias. Columns 1, 5, 9, and 13 report results for simple OLS regressions, where *Owner* is a dummy equal to one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and equal to zero if it received support from the association. The remaining columns show results for two-stage least squares regressions. In the first stage, we regress the dummy variable *Owner* on the political variables from above (dummies for the electoral cycle, competitive counties, and conservative bank chairmen), and the additional dummy variables specified at the bottom of the table. In the second stage, predicted probabilities from the first stage are used to predict the five-year change in the respective variable. Again, we include the additional dummy variables denoted at the bottom of the table. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, \*\* at the 5 %-level, and \*\*\* at the 1 %-level.