MTEI Seminar by Prof. Yuri Levin, Queen's School of Business
Event details
| Date | 19.02.2015 |
| Hour | 14:00 › 15:30 |
| Speaker | Prof. Yuri Levin, Queen's School of Business |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
"Quantity Competition in the Presence of Strategic Consumers"
Abstract:
Oligopolistic retailers decide on the initial inventories of an undifferentiated limited-lifetime product offered to strategic consumers. A manufacturer sets the first-period (full) price, while the second-period (clearance) price is determined by a market clearing process. Resulting symmetric pure-strategy equilibria may lead to no sales in the first or second period (Cournot outcome versus collusion), and sales in both periods with the clearance price above or at the salvage value. The equilibria possess a comprehensive set of monotonic properties. In particular, increasing strategic behavior can benefit retailers and hurt consumers, increasing competition may harm the local economy, and high levels of strategic behavior may insure against oversupply that leads to clearance sales at the salvage value. The welfare-optimal number of retailers can lead to the above-cost clearance price.
Joint work with Andrei Bazhanov and Mikhail Nediak
Bio:
Yuri Levin is Distinguished Professor of Operations Management and the inaugural Director of Master of Management Analytics programme at Queen's School of Business. He teaches analytical decision making and pricing and revenue optimization courses in MBA, MMA, and Executive Education programmes. He holds a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Rutgers University in the US where he taught in different MBA programmes for 3 years before joining Queen's in 2002. Yuri was the 2013 and 2014 recipient of the MBA Professor of the Year Award and the 2014 recipient of the Master of Management Analytics Professor of the Year Award. He has developed innovative approaches and published widely in the general area of revenue management and dynamic pricing. He was a co-winner of 2013 INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Practice Prize for pricing and promotions analysis at Molson Coors Brewing Company and a co-winner of 2009 INFORMS COIN-OR Cup for applications of COIN-OR technologies in development of novel techniques for cargo capacity management and dynamic pricing. He was also the 2010 recipient of Queen's School of Business Award for Research Achievement and 2003 New Researcher Achievement Award. Yuri is an Associate Editor of Journal of Revenue Management and Pricing. He served as Chair of INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing section, Associate Editor of Management Science in the area of Operations Management, and was a Guest Editor of the special issue of European Journal of Operational Research on Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing. Yuri's research has been funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada. Yuri has consulted widely on consumer behavior modeling and optimization of pricing and developed corporate training programmes in strategic analytics, operations management and strategic pricing optimization.
Abstract:
Oligopolistic retailers decide on the initial inventories of an undifferentiated limited-lifetime product offered to strategic consumers. A manufacturer sets the first-period (full) price, while the second-period (clearance) price is determined by a market clearing process. Resulting symmetric pure-strategy equilibria may lead to no sales in the first or second period (Cournot outcome versus collusion), and sales in both periods with the clearance price above or at the salvage value. The equilibria possess a comprehensive set of monotonic properties. In particular, increasing strategic behavior can benefit retailers and hurt consumers, increasing competition may harm the local economy, and high levels of strategic behavior may insure against oversupply that leads to clearance sales at the salvage value. The welfare-optimal number of retailers can lead to the above-cost clearance price.
Joint work with Andrei Bazhanov and Mikhail Nediak
Bio:
Yuri Levin is Distinguished Professor of Operations Management and the inaugural Director of Master of Management Analytics programme at Queen's School of Business. He teaches analytical decision making and pricing and revenue optimization courses in MBA, MMA, and Executive Education programmes. He holds a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Rutgers University in the US where he taught in different MBA programmes for 3 years before joining Queen's in 2002. Yuri was the 2013 and 2014 recipient of the MBA Professor of the Year Award and the 2014 recipient of the Master of Management Analytics Professor of the Year Award. He has developed innovative approaches and published widely in the general area of revenue management and dynamic pricing. He was a co-winner of 2013 INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Practice Prize for pricing and promotions analysis at Molson Coors Brewing Company and a co-winner of 2009 INFORMS COIN-OR Cup for applications of COIN-OR technologies in development of novel techniques for cargo capacity management and dynamic pricing. He was also the 2010 recipient of Queen's School of Business Award for Research Achievement and 2003 New Researcher Achievement Award. Yuri is an Associate Editor of Journal of Revenue Management and Pricing. He served as Chair of INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing section, Associate Editor of Management Science in the area of Operations Management, and was a Guest Editor of the special issue of European Journal of Operational Research on Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing. Yuri's research has been funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada. Yuri has consulted widely on consumer behavior modeling and optimization of pricing and developed corporate training programmes in strategic analytics, operations management and strategic pricing optimization.
Practical information
- General public
- Free
Organizer
- Management of Technology & Entrepreneurship Institute