Voluntary Disclosures and Informed Trading
Event details
| Date | 10.11.2015 |
| Hour | 12:00 › 13:00 |
| Speaker | Evgeny PETROV (PhD Student, SFI@EPFL) |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
I develop a model of voluntary corporate disclosures to asymmetrically informed risk-averse traders who can acquire costly private information. The firm manager who maximizes the firm's asset price faces a tradeoff. On the one hand, optimal disclosure should alleviate information asymmetry to increase the price. On the other hand, reducing information asymmetry decreases the profits of informed traders, crowds out private information acquisition and drives the price down. The crowding-out effect gives novel predictions. For example, higher risk-aversion of traders or higher cost of private information acquisition can make manager disclose less information.
Practical information
- Informed public
- Invitation required
- This event is internal