Voting and Trading on Public Information
Event details
| Date | 20.09.2024 |
| Hour | 11:45 › 13:00 |
| Speaker | Paul Voss - HEC Paris |
| Location |
UniL Campus, Room Extra 126
|
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
| Event Language | English |
This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. Although public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to sell their shares rather than to vote. As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. We show that, overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, the effect of more precise public information on corporate decision-making is non-monotonic. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.
(with Markus Parlasca)
Links
Practical information
- Informed public
- Free