Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?

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Cancelled

Event details

Date 20.03.2015
Hour 10:3012:00
Speaker B. Espen ECKBO (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth)
Location
Category Conferences - Seminars
The estimated probability that a bidder offers all-stock as payment in takeovers increases with measures of market overvaluation of bidder shares. However, when we instrument the bidder pricing error using aggregate mutual fund flows, the reverse happens: greater bidder overvaluation reduces the all-stock payment  propensity. Since the price pressure created by aggregate fund flows is exogenous to bidder fundamentals - while directly impacting bidder pricing errors - this  evidence rejects the notion that all-stock financed takeovers are opportunistic. Bidders paying with stock tend to be small, non- dividend paying growth companies with low leverage, suggesting that financing constraints play an important role in the all-stock payment decision. Moreover, all-stock payment is more likely in  high-tech industries, when the two firms operate in highly complementary industries, and when the target is geographically close, indicating that targets in all-stock bids are relatively informed about bidder value. Overall, our evidence does not suggest a particular role for bidder mispricing in driving the all-stock payment decision in takeovers.