CESS Seminar: Routing Games in Traffic Networks with Mixed Autonomy
Event details
| Date | 29.03.2019 |
| Hour | 12:15 › 13:00 |
| Speaker | Prof. Ramtin Pedarsani, University of California Santa Barbara |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
Abstract
In this talk, we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to selfish routing and bound the Price of Anarchy (PoA), the maximum ratio between total delay experienced by selfish users and the minimum possible total delay. We find these bounds depend on: 1) the degree of the polynomial in the road cost function and 2) the degree of asymmetry, the difference in how human-driven and autonomous traffic affect congestion. We demonstrate that these bounds recover the classical bounds when no asymmetry exists.
In the second part of the talk, we develop a model of road congestion on shared roads based on the fundamental diagram of traffic. We further design optimal routing algorithms when users have varying degrees of altruism. We find that even with arbitrarily small altruism, total latency can be unboundedly better than without altruism, and that the best selfish equilibrium can be unboundedly better than the worst selfish equilibrium. We validate our theoretical results through microscopic traffic simulations and show average latency decrease of a factor of 4 from worst-case selfish equilibrium to the optimal equilibrium when autonomous vehicles are altruistic.
Bio
Ramtin Pedarsani is an assistant professor in the ECE department at UCSB. He obtained his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences from UC Berkeley in 2015. He received his M.Sc. degree at EPFL in 2011 and his B.Sc. degree at the University of Tehran in 2009. His research interests include machine learning, game theory, information and coding theory, and transportation systems. He is the recipient of the best paper award in the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) in 2014.
In this talk, we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to selfish routing and bound the Price of Anarchy (PoA), the maximum ratio between total delay experienced by selfish users and the minimum possible total delay. We find these bounds depend on: 1) the degree of the polynomial in the road cost function and 2) the degree of asymmetry, the difference in how human-driven and autonomous traffic affect congestion. We demonstrate that these bounds recover the classical bounds when no asymmetry exists.
In the second part of the talk, we develop a model of road congestion on shared roads based on the fundamental diagram of traffic. We further design optimal routing algorithms when users have varying degrees of altruism. We find that even with arbitrarily small altruism, total latency can be unboundedly better than without altruism, and that the best selfish equilibrium can be unboundedly better than the worst selfish equilibrium. We validate our theoretical results through microscopic traffic simulations and show average latency decrease of a factor of 4 from worst-case selfish equilibrium to the optimal equilibrium when autonomous vehicles are altruistic.
Bio
Ramtin Pedarsani is an assistant professor in the ECE department at UCSB. He obtained his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences from UC Berkeley in 2015. He received his M.Sc. degree at EPFL in 2011 and his B.Sc. degree at the University of Tehran in 2009. His research interests include machine learning, game theory, information and coding theory, and transportation systems. He is the recipient of the best paper award in the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) in 2014.
Practical information
- Informed public
- Free
- This event is internal
Organizer
- Profs. Brice Lecampion & Alexandre Alahi
Contact
- Prof. Nikolas Geroliminis