Investigating the Limits of Anonymous Communication Systems
Event details
| Date | 15.04.2025 |
| Hour | 16:00 › 18:00 |
| Speaker | Eric Jollès |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
EDIC candidacy exam
Exam president: Prof. Patrick Thiran
Thesis advisor: Prof. Carmela Troncoso
Thesis co-advisor: Prof Katerina Argyraki
Co-examiner: Prof. Thomas Bourgeat
Abstract
Anonymous communication systems are necessary to protect user privacy while providing access to information.
Tor is the most widely used of these systems, with over 2 million daily users.
However, Tor faces challenges from powerful adversaries such as content delivery networks, Internet service providers, and nation-states, which can exploit advances in machine learning and large-scale traffic analysis to deanonymize the communication of these users.
The three papers we review highlight that current anonymous communication systems struggle to protect users for basic web browsing.
They examine various points of attack within these systems, exploit them to demonstrate privacy vulnerabilities, and propose potential defenses.
Together, these papers contribute to a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of existing anonymous communication systems and what can realistically be achieved anonymously on the internet today.
Selected papers
RAPTOR attacks: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/sun
SoK: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10179289
Loopix: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/piotrowska
Exam president: Prof. Patrick Thiran
Thesis advisor: Prof. Carmela Troncoso
Thesis co-advisor: Prof Katerina Argyraki
Co-examiner: Prof. Thomas Bourgeat
Abstract
Anonymous communication systems are necessary to protect user privacy while providing access to information.
Tor is the most widely used of these systems, with over 2 million daily users.
However, Tor faces challenges from powerful adversaries such as content delivery networks, Internet service providers, and nation-states, which can exploit advances in machine learning and large-scale traffic analysis to deanonymize the communication of these users.
The three papers we review highlight that current anonymous communication systems struggle to protect users for basic web browsing.
They examine various points of attack within these systems, exploit them to demonstrate privacy vulnerabilities, and propose potential defenses.
Together, these papers contribute to a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of existing anonymous communication systems and what can realistically be achieved anonymously on the internet today.
Selected papers
RAPTOR attacks: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/sun
SoK: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10179289
Loopix: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/piotrowska
Practical information
- General public
- Free
Contact
- edic@epfl.ch