Seminar by Prof. Yaroslav Rosokha, Purdue University

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Event details

Date 18.03.2016
Hour 12:0013:30
Speaker Prof. Yaroslav Rosokha, Purdue University
Location
Category Conferences - Seminars
"Constructing Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”


Abstract:
We propose a new approach for running lab experiments on indefinitely repeated games with high continuation probability.  The approach has two main advantages.  First, it allows us to run multiple long repeated games per session.  Second, it allows us to incorporate the strategy method with minimal restrictions on the types of strategies that can be constructed.  This gives us insight into what happens in long repeated games and into the types of strategies that subjects use. We report results obtained from the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with a continuation probability of $ \delta = .99 $. We find rates of cooperation that are lower than expected, given that the indefinitely repeated games are long and the setting is approaching the continuous time form. However, when we analyze the constructed strategies our results are largely similar to those found in the literature, specifically that the most common strategies are memory-1 strategies such as Tit-For-Tat, Grim Trigger, and Always Defect.

Practical information

  • General public
  • Free

Organizer

  • College of Management of Technology

Contact

  • cdm-seminars@epfl.ch

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