Side-channel evaluation of NIST's candidates for post-quantum standardisation
Event details
| Date | 13.09.2018 |
| Hour | 10:00 › 12:00 |
| Speaker | Aymeric Genet |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
EDIC candidacy exam
Exam president: Prof. Babak Falsafi
Thesis advisor: Prof. Arjen Lenstra
Thesis co-advisor: Prof. Serge Vaudenay
Co-examiner: Prof. Bryan Ford
Abstract
Because large-scale quantum computers will be able to break the security of current public-key cryptography, substitutes resistant to quantum computing (known as post-quantum cryptography) are currently being standardized by the NIST. An essential step in the standardization process of post-quantum cryptography is the security of the implementations, notably to side-channel attacks.
This report emphasizes on this importance by first presenting the post-quantum cryptosystem BLISS where strong security reductions were applied to give a convincing security proof. Even though the scheme was proven secure, BLISS was subject to powerful side-channel attacks that exploited the implementation improvements, resulting in the recovery of the secret key through either power analysis, or branch tracing. These results are compared to the speed-up obtained using the state of the art in terms of lattice basis reduction-a massively parallel algorithm able to solve the Shortest Vector Problem challenge of dimension 150. In conclusion, the speed-up was not significant enough to impact the security of BLISS. Based on this, the report ends on a research proposal on side-channel against the NIST's candidates for post-quantum standardization.
Background papers
Lattice Signatures and Bimodal Gaussians (BLISS), by Ducas, L., et al.
Side-Channel Attacks on BLISS Lattice-Based Signatures -- Exploiting Branch Tracing Against strongSwan and Electromagnetic Emanations in Microcontrollers, by Espitau, T., et al.
Fast Lattice Basis Reduction Suitable for Massive Parallelization and Its Application to the Shortest Vector Problem, by Teruya , T., et al.
Exam president: Prof. Babak Falsafi
Thesis advisor: Prof. Arjen Lenstra
Thesis co-advisor: Prof. Serge Vaudenay
Co-examiner: Prof. Bryan Ford
Abstract
Because large-scale quantum computers will be able to break the security of current public-key cryptography, substitutes resistant to quantum computing (known as post-quantum cryptography) are currently being standardized by the NIST. An essential step in the standardization process of post-quantum cryptography is the security of the implementations, notably to side-channel attacks.
This report emphasizes on this importance by first presenting the post-quantum cryptosystem BLISS where strong security reductions were applied to give a convincing security proof. Even though the scheme was proven secure, BLISS was subject to powerful side-channel attacks that exploited the implementation improvements, resulting in the recovery of the secret key through either power analysis, or branch tracing. These results are compared to the speed-up obtained using the state of the art in terms of lattice basis reduction-a massively parallel algorithm able to solve the Shortest Vector Problem challenge of dimension 150. In conclusion, the speed-up was not significant enough to impact the security of BLISS. Based on this, the report ends on a research proposal on side-channel against the NIST's candidates for post-quantum standardization.
Background papers
Lattice Signatures and Bimodal Gaussians (BLISS), by Ducas, L., et al.
Side-Channel Attacks on BLISS Lattice-Based Signatures -- Exploiting Branch Tracing Against strongSwan and Electromagnetic Emanations in Microcontrollers, by Espitau, T., et al.
Fast Lattice Basis Reduction Suitable for Massive Parallelization and Its Application to the Shortest Vector Problem, by Teruya , T., et al.
Practical information
- General public
- Free
Contact
- EDIC - [email protected]