Structuring Online Communities
Event details
| Date | 11.01.2023 |
| Hour | 14:00 › 15:00 |
| Speaker | Dr. Neha Sharma |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
| Event Language | English |
Abstract:
Online Question and Answer communities were started to supplement customer support services. In contrast to conventional customer support, users in online communities can post questions, and other users with more experience or knowledge can answer these questions. Generally, question answerers get rewards and visibility in the community while the askers gain knowledge if their questions get answered. We model the community as a multistage stochastic game where users have different skill levels. We study how users decide to join, leave, and participate in these communities.
We link the user participation decisions to the underlying network structure of the community. Theoretically, we show that under most parameters, only a core-periphery network structure can emerge in such communities. This network structure has been empirically observed in most online communities. Finally, we explore the cost of asking questions as a lever that a community designer can use to balance user participation and the community’s efficiency in providing answers to users’ questions. We find that increasing the cost of asking questions in the community improves the proportion of askers that get answers to their questions. This results in higher user satisfaction. However, a higher asking cost lowers the participation level in the community. This trade-off between participation and community efficiency results in non-monotonicity in the number of users in the community with the participation cost. The communities typically operationalize higher asking costs by either directly penalizing question-asking activity or setting up stricter guidelines for questions to be answered. We find that increasing the cost of asking is not always bad for the community. A higher asking cost can lead to an increase in the number of users in the community. We also discuss how the existence of low-knowledge users in the community (and not necessarily the high-knowledge users) is essential to the survival of such communities.
Bio: I am a doctoral candidate in Operations Management at Kellogg School of Management. I am on the 2022-2023 job market. I am very fortunate to be advised by Prof. Achal Bassamboo, Prof. Gad Allon, and Prof. Milind Sohoni. My research focuses on problems in service operations with novel business models and strategic agents. I have worked on designing knowledge-sharing platforms where there is no clear separation between consumers and producers (for instance, Question and Answer communities) and online asset-sharing platforms for urban mobility where asset-owners are scarce (for example, highly regulated or developing economies). I enjoy using data to support and build analytical models, I have been collaborating with multiple firms to answer relevant problems with immense potential for social impact.
Online Question and Answer communities were started to supplement customer support services. In contrast to conventional customer support, users in online communities can post questions, and other users with more experience or knowledge can answer these questions. Generally, question answerers get rewards and visibility in the community while the askers gain knowledge if their questions get answered. We model the community as a multistage stochastic game where users have different skill levels. We study how users decide to join, leave, and participate in these communities.
We link the user participation decisions to the underlying network structure of the community. Theoretically, we show that under most parameters, only a core-periphery network structure can emerge in such communities. This network structure has been empirically observed in most online communities. Finally, we explore the cost of asking questions as a lever that a community designer can use to balance user participation and the community’s efficiency in providing answers to users’ questions. We find that increasing the cost of asking questions in the community improves the proportion of askers that get answers to their questions. This results in higher user satisfaction. However, a higher asking cost lowers the participation level in the community. This trade-off between participation and community efficiency results in non-monotonicity in the number of users in the community with the participation cost. The communities typically operationalize higher asking costs by either directly penalizing question-asking activity or setting up stricter guidelines for questions to be answered. We find that increasing the cost of asking is not always bad for the community. A higher asking cost can lead to an increase in the number of users in the community. We also discuss how the existence of low-knowledge users in the community (and not necessarily the high-knowledge users) is essential to the survival of such communities.
Bio: I am a doctoral candidate in Operations Management at Kellogg School of Management. I am on the 2022-2023 job market. I am very fortunate to be advised by Prof. Achal Bassamboo, Prof. Gad Allon, and Prof. Milind Sohoni. My research focuses on problems in service operations with novel business models and strategic agents. I have worked on designing knowledge-sharing platforms where there is no clear separation between consumers and producers (for instance, Question and Answer communities) and online asset-sharing platforms for urban mobility where asset-owners are scarce (for example, highly regulated or developing economies). I enjoy using data to support and build analytical models, I have been collaborating with multiple firms to answer relevant problems with immense potential for social impact.
Practical information
- General public
- Free
Organizer
- Prof. Daniel Kuhn