Countering Side-Channel Analysis and Fault-Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware Implementations
Event details
| Date | 02.02.2017 |
| Hour | 14:15 |
| Speaker | Dr Amir Moradi, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany |
| Location |
ME D2 1124
|
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
Abstract
Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as major threats to any cryptographic implementation. Hardening cryptographic implementations with appropriate countermeasures is thus essential before they are deployed in the wild. However, countermeasures for both threats are of completely different nature: Side-channel analysis is mitigated by techniques that hide or mask key-dependent information while resistance against fault-injection attacks can be achieved by redundancy in the computation for immediate error detection. Since already the integration of any single countermeasure in cryptographic hardware comes with significant costs in terms of performance and area, a combination of multiple countermeasures is expensive and often associated with undesired side effects. In this talk, a countermeasure for cryptographic hardware implementations is introduced that combines the concept of a provably-secure masking scheme (i.e., threshold implementation) with an error detecting approach against fault injection.
Bio:
Amir Moradi received the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in computer engineering from Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Afterwards, till 2015 he worked as a Post-Doctoral researcher at the chair for Embedded Security, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Germany. Since 2016, after obtaining the Habilitation degree, he has become a senior researcher and faculty member at the faculty of electrical engineering and information technology at Ruhr University Bochum. His current research interests include physical security of embedded systems, passive side-channel analysis attacks, and the corresponding countermeasures. He has published over 70 peer-reviewed journal articles and conference papers, in both destructive and constructive aspects of side-channel analysis. He also served as Program Committee Member (and the Chair) of several security- and cryptography-related conferences and workshops.
Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as major threats to any cryptographic implementation. Hardening cryptographic implementations with appropriate countermeasures is thus essential before they are deployed in the wild. However, countermeasures for both threats are of completely different nature: Side-channel analysis is mitigated by techniques that hide or mask key-dependent information while resistance against fault-injection attacks can be achieved by redundancy in the computation for immediate error detection. Since already the integration of any single countermeasure in cryptographic hardware comes with significant costs in terms of performance and area, a combination of multiple countermeasures is expensive and often associated with undesired side effects. In this talk, a countermeasure for cryptographic hardware implementations is introduced that combines the concept of a provably-secure masking scheme (i.e., threshold implementation) with an error detecting approach against fault injection.
Bio:
Amir Moradi received the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in computer engineering from Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Afterwards, till 2015 he worked as a Post-Doctoral researcher at the chair for Embedded Security, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Germany. Since 2016, after obtaining the Habilitation degree, he has become a senior researcher and faculty member at the faculty of electrical engineering and information technology at Ruhr University Bochum. His current research interests include physical security of embedded systems, passive side-channel analysis attacks, and the corresponding countermeasures. He has published over 70 peer-reviewed journal articles and conference papers, in both destructive and constructive aspects of side-channel analysis. He also served as Program Committee Member (and the Chair) of several security- and cryptography-related conferences and workshops.
Practical information
- Informed public
- Free
Organizer
- Dean's Office, School of Engineering
Contact
- Sylvie Moreau