From the dullest fields of authentication to the greener pastures
Event details
| Date | 23.06.2011 |
| Hour | 11:15 |
| Speaker | Dr Pedro Peris-Lopez, Delft University |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
In recent times, many generally short lived RFID authentication protocols have been proposed with only moderate success. The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume proximity between readers and tags, due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick the latter into thinking that the former is in close proximity. This attack is generally known as a relay attack and can come in different shapes, including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinder relay attacks, and some interesting proposals have grown lately. Another very exciting problem, introduced by Juels in 2004, is how to show that two tags have been simultaneously scanned. This could potentially have numerous real life applications. He called this kind of evidence a yoking-proof, and it is expected to be verifiable offline. Then, some authors suggested the generalization of the proof for a larger number of tags. This is another very promising and still quite unexplored research field. Prof. Peris-Lopez' homepage
Practical information
- General public
- Free